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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ANTHROPOCENTRISM AS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC
Ever since the environment and nonhumanity became major ethical topics, humancentered worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings
with nature. Those who consider themselves nonanthropocentrists typically assume
that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie all of the
environmental degradations associated with our species. On the other hand, a handful
of environmental philosophers argue that anthropocentrism is perfectly acceptable as a
foundation for environmental ethics. According to Bryan Norton’s convergence
hypothesis, “If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate policies, a
nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as a suitably
broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism” (Norton 2004:11). Norton notes that
although adherents to either ism may disagree about the relative importance of the
various reasons they have for advocating such policies, they nevertheless share an equal
commitment to protecting the environment. Because any form of anthropocentrism
must fundamentally favor humanity over nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are
nevertheless concerned that such favoritism is “nothing more than the expression of an
irrational bias” (Taylor 1981:215). They reason that only a nonanthropocentric ethic can
guarantee that policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their interests conflict with
those of nonhumans. I argue that critics of convergence fail to appreciate that Norton’s
hypothesis is limited to ideologies that he deems “reasonable” and “suitably broad and
long-sighted,” or else they misapprehend what these terms imply. When it comes to
ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum
according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or
collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales. The most unreasonable, narrow,
and short-sighted ideologies are those that are the most individualistic. It is at the
collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place. I
defend a version of anthropocentrism that I term ecological anthropocentrism.
KEYWORDS: Anthropocentrism, Nonanthropocentrism, Convergence Hypothesis, Bryan
Norton, Axiom of Future Value, J. Baird Callicott
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Preface
The first time that I encountered the term anthropocentrism in a philosophical
text, it was used pejoratively to indicate an irresponsible set of attitudes and behaviors
toward the environment and nonhumanity in general. Of course, this was no mere
coincidence. Ever since animal philosophy and environmental philosophy emerged as
distinct disciplines, their founders have almost universally categorized anthropocentrism
as a morally reprehensible worldview along the same lines as classism, racism, sexism,
xenophobia, and the like. Nonanthropocentrists claim that, because our intellectual
traditions have been unwaveringly human-centered, orthodox ethical theories have
limited ascriptions of moral significance (intrinsic or inherent value) to human beings.
They argue that as a result, nonhuman aspects of the world have largely been appraised
only

in

terms

of

their

instrumental

value

to

humans.

Consequently,

nonanthropocentrists hold, the anthropocentric, or human-centered, focus of
traditional ethical frameworks ultimately justifies the exploitation of nonhumanity and
is thus primarily to blame for enabling the ecological predicament that human societies
have created. On the other hand, nonanthropocentrists claim, if nonhuman aspects of
the world were accorded the sort of intrinsic value recognized in humans,
anthropogenic ecological degradations would no longer be deemed justifiable.
Nonanthropocentrists assume that, just as widespread adoption of the anthropocentric
worldview (that humans or persons are intrinsically valuable) has (allegedly) resulted in
the abolition of sexism, racism, and so on, the ecologically irresponsible exploitation of
nature would be overcome by widespread adoption of nonanthropocentrism.
v

After being exposed to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, it struck me that
so-called nonanthropocentrists do not merely want to ‘save’ nature for its own sake but
also for the sake of humanity. According to the convergence hypothesis, if an advocate
of anthropocentrism “takes the full range of human values—present and future—into
account, [s/he] will choose a set of policies that can also be accepted by an advocate of
a consistent and reasonable nonanthropocentrism” (Norton 1997:87). In other words,
an anthropocentric environmental ethic is not a contradiction in terms; it is possible to
justify ecologically responsible policies for strictly human-centered reasons.
If adding the idea of intrinsic value to that of enlightened human interest
creates no difference in mandated behaviors, and indicates no real
changes in behavior from following “broad anthropocentrism,” then. . .
the “metaphysical” idea that nature has “intrinsic value” is shown to have
at best only ideological and rhetorical use (Norton 2009:246).
Nonanthropocentrists may be largely ‘preaching to the choir’ since their rhetoric
most likely appeals to those who already share their intuitions that nonhuman entities
are valuable in or for themselves.

As Norton argues, due to the severity of the

ecological predicament and given the fact that politicians and humans at large are more
easily swayed by human-favoring arguments, it seems much more practical for
environmentalists to utilize anthropocentrism rather than to reject it. The dissertation
that follows is my attempt to demonstrate that an ecological form of anthropocentrism,
such as that defended by Norton, provides a strong foundation for a rationally
defensible environmental ethic. I also aim to demonstrate that advocates of ecological
anthropocentrism

converge

with

advocates

vi

of

“consistent

and

reasonable”

nonanthropocentrism on the general sorts of environmental policies they both endorse
and reject.
In Chapter One, I provide a general introduction to the dissertation, discuss some
basic aspects of the ecological predicament that human societies have created, and
question whether environmentalists should regret humanity’s existence because of the
atrocities that human societies have committed against nature. Since the current
anthropogenic mass extinction event is among the worst ecological calamities to affect
Earth’s biosphere over the past 600 million years, it certainly seems that
environmentalists have cause to experience immense regret. I adapt an argument
made by Saul Smilansky to question whether environmentalists, if forced to choose,
would be willing to ‘restore’ all anthropogenically extirpated species to their ‘natural’
state if such a restoration could only be achieved by removing Homo sapiens from
existence. I demonstrate that in spite of their sometimes overtly misanthropic rhetoric,
nonanthropocentrists converge with anthropocentrists in favoring humanity’s existence.
This demonstration provides support for Norton’s convergence hypothesis and
establishes the basic thesis that “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists at least implicitly
subscribe to what Norton calls the Axiom of Future Value. According to this axiom, a
world with humans in it is preferable to one in which they are absent, and we have a
duty therefore to protect our species’ prospects for evolutionary success.
In Chapter Two, I provide further support for Norton’s convergence hypothesis
and address some common arguments leveled against anthropocentrism. I point out
that Norton’s critics tend to ignore the fact that his hypothesis only applies to longvii

sighted, nonindividualistic, and “reasonable” varieties of anthropocentrism and
nonanthropocentrism as opposed to varieties that are short-sighted, individualistic, and
radical. Nonanthropocentrists’ arguments against anthropocentrism (such for example,
that it involves questionable ontological and axiological assumptions) simply do not
apply to the ecological anthropocentrism defended by Norton.

For, ecological

anthropocentrists do not assume that humans are the center of the universe or that the
purpose of nonhumanity’s existence is to satisfy human preferences or interests. Nor
do ecological anthropocentrists rely on nonanthropocentrists’ questionable claims
regarding the practical effects of changing how humans ascribe intrinsic value. Because
the widely accepted idea that humans are intrinsically valuable has not universally
improved humanity’s lot, it seems naïve to assume that broadening ascriptions of
intrinsic value to include nonhumanity will fix humanity’s ecological predicament. I also
question the coherence of a genuinely nonanthropocentric view since if such a view
were truly free of human-favoring biases, it would not likely lead one to formulate
priority principles that adjudicate in favor of humans when their interests or preferences
conflict with those of nonhumans. I conclude the chapter by arguing that Smilansky’s
form of regret, coupled with a not-so-ignorant, intertemporal Rawlsian veil, can be used
to determine what sorts of environmental policies rational persons of possible futures
would condemn or condone.
In Chapter Three, I argue in support of the moral relevance of a geologic
spatiotemporal scale since such a scale is required to fully appreciate a species’
evolutionary success. I claim that environmentalists’ explicit or implicit adherence to
viii

the Axiom of Future Value entails that they must find a geologic scale morally relevant.
According to this axiom it is the duty of extant humans to do what they can to help
ensure that our species and its evolutionary successors go on existing indefinitely. A
mammalian species such as Homo sapiens should be expected to persist for millions of
years, yet anatomically modern humans have only been around for a fraction of that
time. During humanity’s geologically brief tenure on Earth, humans have managed to
seriously degrade the resource base that could otherwise have promoted their
geologically long-term existence. If humans are to go on existing for the millions of
years that could be natural for them, current generations must seriously consider the
long-term effects of their collective actions on our planet’s natural resources and on
future humans. Accordingly, I argue that individuals who engage in collective actions
such as the mass consumption of fossil fuels must recognize their complicity in effecting
any harms that result. I also argue by analogy that if we are morally obligated to help
alleviate the suffering of fellow humans regardless of their spatial proximity to us, as
Peter Singer and James Rachels insist, we are likewise obligated to do what we can for
the good of humans regardless of their temporal proximity to us. I close the chapter
with a discussion of extinction. By utilizing a geologic scale, scientists have determined
that species are disappearing at rates that are exponentially higher than the natural,
background rate. Indeed, the current mass extinction event is disturbingly similar to the
five previous major mass extinction events of the past 600 million years. I argue that
while considering extinctions on a geologic scale would lead a holistic rationalist to
exhibit stoic indifference, those who subscribe to the Axiom of Future Value will instead
ix

be compelled to reconsider the ecological legacy that is being bestowed on the future
by collective human actions.
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Chapter One: Should Environmentalists Regret that Humans Exist?
1.1

Apocalypse Now?
Over the past several millennia, human populations have dispersed so widely

and grown to such an extent that they have come to alter the evolutionary trajectory of
almost every form of life on the planet. Although Earth’s biota and ecosystems are
always evolving, few revisions have been as geologically abrupt or extensive as those
brought on by the tremendous selection pressures exerted by our species over the past
50,000 to 70,000 years. All around the globe, species are disappearing and habitats are
being altered at rates that are rare even on a billion-year timescale. Prior to Homo
sapiens’ diaspora out of Africa and Eurasia, Earth’s most extensive biospheric upheavals
were mainly due to abiotic factors such as cosmic collisions and prolonged volcanic
activity. In the past 600 million years, there have been only five mass extinction events
that were severe enough to reduce the number of species by half, the last of which
occurred 65 million years ago. By studying the geologic record of the late Pleistocene,
paleontologists have noted that humanity’s sudden range expansion sharply coincides
with the mass extinction of megafauna in all areas invaded by humans. Scientists also
note that the extinction pulse that began in the Pleistocene has continued to accelerate
in modern times. In fact, the anthropogenic mass extinction event is now recognized to
be disturbingly similar to the ‘big five’ of the geologic past.
Current and projected species extinction rates exceed geologically normal
background rates by several orders of magnitude, indicating that we face
an extinction episode equivalent to mass extinctions of the
paleontological past (Purvis et al. 2000:328).

1

As with past mass extinctions, the impending global crisis has many biotic
losers being replaced by a few increasingly widespread winners. Previous
mass extinctions eliminated over 50% of all species on earth and this
appears to be the likely outcome of current trends with over 50% of
species in most groups in decline. Even if these species (losers) do not
become completely extinct, they will probably be reduced to tiny
fragments of undisturbed habitat and become virtually invisible
components of the biosphere (McKinney and Lockwood 1999:452).
Problems associated with exponential increases in human populations,
particularly over the past couple of centuries and given humanity’s need to exploit ever
more habitats in order to obtain the resources required to satisfy unsustainable,
culturally-ingrained consumption practices, have been exacerbated by both shortsighted technological applications and the globalization of trade. Ecologists warn that
many common practices of human societies are responsible for a host of environmental
problems, such as global warming, the widespread dispersal of invasive species,
abnormally high rates of extinction and biotic homogenization, and disruptions to vital
ecosystem processes. While most of these problems already pose serious threats to the
livelihood of current human populations, particularly that of the underprivileged, they
will only become more acute for future generations. Needless to say, Earth’s nonhuman
populations will be even more disproportionately affected in the future by the
anthropogenic restructuring of our planet’s biotic and abiotic composition. Indeed, an
abnormally high rate of extinction will likely continue, and many survivors among the
species that remain will face increasingly stiff competition for a shrinking resource base.
Environmental philosophy emerged due to the growing awareness among
academicians of the ecological predicament, with most representatives labeling
themselves as nonanthropocentrists.

Nonanthropocentrists mainly distinguish
2

themselves from other philosophers in terms of what aspects of the world they consider
to have intrinsic value or inherent worth. As stated by J. Baird Callicott:
An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus,
confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things,
including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e.,
valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which
may serve human beings. A non-anthropocentric value theory (or
axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some nonhuman beings (Callicott 1984:299).
Especially in the subjectivist version that I endorse, the concept of
intrinsic value of nature, like the concept of human rights, designates less
a substantive thing than a pragmatic limit on policies driven by aggregate
utility. Practically by definition, the adjective 'intrinsic' entails that the
character or property it modifies exists objectively in the entity to which
it is attributed. Indeed, often the adjective 'intrinsic' means that the
character or property it modifies is the very essence of the entity to
which it is attributed. . . . In environmental philosophy, however,
'intrinsic value' has also been consistently implicitly defined, via negativa,
as the antonym of 'instrumental value'. What value remains – if any does
– after all something's instrumental value has been accounted for is its
intrinsic value. . . . Thus to value something intrinsically – as we shift
from the adjectival-objective to the adverbial-subjective form – is to
value something for itself, as an end-in-itself (to reinvoke the Kantian
mode of expression), not merely as a means to our own ends, not merely
as an instrument. From this perspective, there is no objective property in
entities to which the noun 'value' corresponds. Rather we subjects value
objects in one or both of at least two ways – instrumentally or
intrinsically – between which there is no middle term (Callicott 2002:16).
Nonanthropocentrists do not always agree about how to confer such value, however.
Ecocentrists such as Callicott construe the value of larger collectives like species,
ecosystems, and the biosphere to override the value of individual organisms, whereas
biocentrists such as Paul Taylor believe that each (wild) living thing has equal inherent
worth that moral agents have a duty to respect.

Despite such insurmountable

differences, nonanthropocentrists universally agree with Taylor’s assessment that
3

modernity’s post-Copernican, post-Darwinian revision of humanity’s place in nature
entails an equally sweeping revision of human values.
The rejection of the idea of human superiority and, more broadly, of the
idea that any species is inherently superior (or inferior) to any other,
entails its positive counterpart: the principle of species-impartiality. This
is the principle that every species counts as having the same value in the
sense that, regardless of what species a living thing belongs to, it is
deemed to be prima facie deserving of equal concern and consideration
on the part of moral agents. Its good is judged to be worthy of being
preserved and protected as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity
whose good it is. Subscribing to the principle of species-impartiality, we
now see, means regarding every entity that has a good of its own as
possessing inherent worth—the same inherent worth, since none is
superior to another (Taylor 2011:155).
Nonanthropocentrists typically insist that foreseeable ecological dystopias can
be averted but only if our societies replace their anthropocentric biases with the view
that nonhumanity’s value is equal to that of humans. As I explain in Chapter Two,
nonanthropocentrists argue that anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies make
problematic assumptions that facilitate the environmental degradations perpetuated by
our species. The immediate appeal of their critique is understandable since traditional,
pre-Darwinian worldviews in the West set up a bifurcation between humans and the
rest of our planet’s life forms.

Because our species’ most extensive ecological

degradations—which have mainly occurred since the industrial revolution—have been
inordinately affected by consumers in societies whose intellectual founders took
humans to be the measure or measurers of all things, nonanthropocentrists assume that
ecological degradation is an inevitable side effect of a worldview that puts the interests
of humans first.

According to Callicott, “The concept of intrinsic value in nature

functions politically much like the concept of human rights” (Callicott 2002:14). The
4

presumption is that if humans and nonhumans were recognized to be members of the
same moral community, environmental policies would equally acknowledge and protect
their rights to exist. Consequently, speciesism, anthropogenic mass extinction, habitat
loss, and the like would come to an end—just as tribalism, nationalism, racism, and
sexism have (allegedly) been overcome.

I argue in Chapter Two that

nonanthropocentrists such as Callicott seem to have unrealistic expectations regarding
the practical effects of more widespread attributions of intrinsic value.

If the

anthropocentric assumption that humans are intrinsically valuable has indeed been
accepted by most people, this has failed to produce an equally widespread adoption of
policies that universally protect human rights. Massive inequalities between the poor
and the wealthy, as well as various forms of discrimination, continue to exist within and
among human societies regardless of the presumption that within many of these
societies humans are considered to have intrinsic value. Since the intrinsic-value-ofhumanity arguments expressed by legions of moral philosophers over the past couple of
centuries have not yet achieved such philosophers’ desired results, we should not be so
optimistic concerning the desired outcome of the intrinsic-value-of-nonhumanity
arguments of nonanthropocentrists even if they are expressed over a similar expanse of
time. Indeed, many environmentalists claim that human societies are running out of
time. According to Craig Dilworth:
It is most unlikely that any of the radical changes to society and the
economy proposed by environmentalists – especially changes in
philosophies and worldviews – will be adopted in time. Consequently
human civilisation – primarily Western techno-industrial urban society –
will self-destruct, producing massive environmental damage, social chaos
and megadeath (Dilworth 2010:453—454).
5

In spite of such pessimism, Bryan Norton argues that since anthropocentrism has the
upper hand in influencing policy decisions, it would be more reasonable and effective
for environmentalists to use anthropocentric arguments to convince politicians to adopt
environmentally sound policies that will benefit humans and nonhumans alike.
To those who are uncommitted to environmentalism (and this includes
many important decision makers), appeals to intrinsic values in nature
and to rights of nonhumans appear “soft,” “subjective,” and “speculative.”
We can accept this fact of political life without agreeing with it.
Whatever the answer to the intellectual question of whether nonhuman
species have intrinsic value, . . . human-oriented reasons carry more
weight in current policy debates. Given the urgency of environmental
degradation and the irreversibility of losses in biodiversity, it would be
equivalent to fiddling while Rome burns to delay action until the
achievement of a positive social consensus attributing rights and intrinsic
value to nonhuman species (Norton 2004:470).
Furthermore, Norton claims, nonanthropocentrists need not demand that adequate
environmental policies recognize intrinsic values in nature since the full range of values
expressed by humans is much more pluralistic.
The question is not one of determining which objects ‘have’ some reified
type of value, but rather to determine whether good reasons can be
given for invoking a particular value in a particular situation. This line of
reasoning apparently opens up the possibility of reconciling the two sides
in the debate over ‘intrinsic’ versus ‘instrumental’ value in nature – it is
possible to include both instrumental and noninstrumental reasons for
preferring one set of policies to another, without asserting that ‘intrinsic’
value exists independently of human, valuing actions. If we reject this
sharp dichotomy between instrumental and intrinsic values and the
associated classification of natural objects as instruments or as moral
beings, a pluralist and integrative position emerges as a possibility: there
are many ways in which humans value nature and these ways range
along a continuum from entirely self-directed and consumptive uses, and
include also human spiritual values and aesthetic values, and also
noninstrumental valuations. If one forgoes a sharp, definitional
distinction between these two, opposed types of valuing, the moral task
of sorting entities into those that have, and those that lack, this special
6

feature of ‘noninstrumental’ value becomes a nonproblem (Norton
2000:1038).
1.2

Are Human-Centered Worldviews Really to Blame for Our Ecological
Predicament?
Contrary to the claims of nonanthropocentrists, a handful of environmental

philosophers argue that our ecological predicament cannot be attributed to
anthropocentrism itself but instead to a “limited and short-term vision of what
constitutes human well-being” (Grey 1993:468).

According to Bryan Norton’s

convergence hypothesis, “If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate
policies, a nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as
a suitably broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism” (Norton 2004:11).
Environmentalists who endorse a variety of values will nevertheless tend
to see environmental problems in a similar way and will pursue commondenominator goals, even though they might explain and justify those
goals in quite different evaluative language, because the larger context of
environmental management—the context in which all values are
pursued—will be understood as the larger ecological context.
Environmentalists have been able to fashion a working consensus for
addressing environmental problems on an ecological basis precisely
because they understand the world as the context of multiple values.
This understanding unites them behind goals essential to protect a wide
variety of values, however expressed, but the impetus toward the
consensus is scientific. Environmentalists are being driven together by
their commitment to ecological contextualism, which implies that all
human values depend upon a healthy context (Norton 1991:197).
Norton and other ecological anthropocentrists claim that currently foreseeable
ecological dystopias can be averted with the adoption of a form of anthropocentrism
that is worthy of rational support. In their eyes, it is not the case that we have been too
human-centered but instead, that we have not been human-centered enough.
Nonanthropocentrists who reject Norton’s convergence hypothesis, they insist, must
7

provide an adequate response to the following question:

Assuming that

anthropocentrism is an ideology that favors satisfying the interests, preferences, and
values of collective humanity and not merely those of individual humans, why have
societies under its sway permitted policies that are foreseeably detrimental to the longterm satisfaction of basic and vital human interests, preferences, and values? After all,
those who directly benefit from ecological irresponsibility and degradation tend to
represent a very small portion of humanity. Unless anthropocentrism is necessarily
equated with a form of egoism that condones policies favoring satisfaction of the shortterm interests, preferences, and values of the few at the expense of the long-term
interests, preferences, and values of the many, it is problematic to conclude that a
human-centered worldview is inherently devastating to the environment.

As Tim

Hayward points out:
Proposals for the ‘rejection’ of anthropocentrism are unhelpful because
they cloud the real problem they think to address. The problem has to do
with a lack of concern with nonhumans but the term anthropocentrism
can all too plausibly be understood as meaning an excessive concern with
humans. The latter, however, is not the problem at all. On the contrary,
a cursory glance around the world would confirm that humans show a
lamentable lack of interest in the wellbeing of other humans. Moreover,
even when it is not other humans whose interests are being harmed, but
other species or the environment, it would generally be implausible to
suggest that those doing the harm are being ‘human-centred’. To see
this, one only has to consider some typical practices which are
appropriately criticised. . . . In the case of hunting a species to extinction,
this is not helpfully or appropriately seen as ‘anthropocentrism’ since it
typically involves one group of humans who are actually condemned by
(probably a majority of) other humans who see the practice not as
serving human interests in general, but the interests of one quite
narrowly-defined group, such as poachers or whalers. A similar point can
be made regarding the destruction of the forest – for those who derive
economic benefit from the destruction oppose not only the human
interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby destroyed,
8

but also the interests of all humans who depend on the oxygen such
forests produce (Hayward 1997:57—58).
If human-centered worldviews are to blame for humanity’s ecological
predicament, they must differ significantly from the “sufficiently broad and long-sighted”
anthropocentrism to which Norton’s convergence hypothesis applies.

Accordingly,

nonanthropocentrists should focus their critiques on those particular human-favoring
worldviews that can be legitimately blamed for humanity’s detrimental impacts on our
planet’s biosphere. It is not anthropocentrism as such that must be rejected but its
problematic forms, in particular, those that are egoistic or otherwise narrowly focused
on individuals and on the limited scales of space and time that are meaningful to
individuals. Nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum
according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or
collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales. As Norton explains:
Theoreticians differ wildly in what intrinsic value is, what it means to
have it, and what entities in fact have it. Similarly, anthropocentrists
differ regarding how far into the future our obligations to future people
extend. So there are really several “families” of both anthropocentric
and nonanthropocentric theories of environmental value (Norton
2009:239).
The ideologies that Norton would construe to be the most unreasonable, narrow, and
short-sighted are typically those that are also the most individualistic, such as Taylor’s
egalitarian biocentrism. Coincidentally, defenders of “reasonably interpreted” forms of
nonanthropocentrism, such as Callicott, reject highly individualistic forms of
nonanthropocentrism for similar reasons. As I will demonstrate later, it is at the
collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place.
9

1.3

Regarding Smilanskian Regret – Should We Be Sorry that We Exist?
One of the distinguishing features of environmental ethics is an expansion of the

spatiotemporal limits of current humans’ moral obligations to fellow humans and other
entities. Whether they are anthropocentrists or nonanthropocentrists, environmental
philosophers typically insist that we have stronger moral obligations to protect the
interests, preferences, or values of Earth’s future life forms than are called for by
traditional ethical frameworks. As Norton states it, “Standard contemporary ethical
theories, at least in the United States and Western Europe are essentially
individualistic. . . . The behavioral prohibitions embodied in them derive from the
principle that actions ought not to harm other individuals unjustifiably” (Norton
1984:139). Because of their individualistic focus, traditional ethics do not require agents
to consider the effects of their actions beyond spatiotemporal scales that are
meaningful to individuals. Norton argues that an adequate environmental ethic must be
both long-sighted and nonindividualistic. According to Norton, the central task of such
an ethic is to indefinitely protect Earth’s natural resources.
Concern for the continued flow of resources insures that sources of
goods and services such as ecosystems, soil, forests, etc. remain
"healthy" and are not deteriorating. In this way, options are held open
and reasonable needs of individuals for whatever goods and services can
be fulfilled with reasonable labor, technology, and ingenuity. The
emphasis of this concern, however, is not individualistic since it is not
focused on the fulfillment of specifiable needs, but rather on the integrity
and health of ongoing ecosystems as holistic entities (ibid.:144).
Creating a sustainable society, including democratic institutions to
control resource use and implementing conservation policies requires a
multigenerational temporal horizon of perception and evaluation. These
are the communal values that are relevant to assessing whether a society
can survive in a specific place for many generations; and these are the
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values that are relevant to intergenerational comparisons and judgments
of intergenerational equity (Norton 2000:38).
Meanwhile, Saul Smilansky has recently called into question commonly accepted
intuitions regarding intergenerational equity and our moral obligations to entities of the
past, specifically, to humans of the past who were victims of massive atrocities.
Although

Smilansky’s

purely

anthropocentric

argument

is

not

aimed

at

environmentalists, it can be reframed to address their concerns about humanity’s
impact on the environment and to highlight the depth or shallowness of their
nonanthropocentrism. As I argue in Chapter Two, Smilansky’s ideas can serve as a
useful tool for determining which current or proposed environmental policies ecological
anthropocentrists and “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists of the indefinite future would
agree upon endorsing or rejecting. In this chapter, I adapt Smilansky’s argument to
demonstrate that despite the misanthropic rhetoric of nonanthropocentrists that nature
would be better off without humans, the nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists
identified by Norton’s convergence hypothesis indeed converge in being equally
tolerant of our species’ continued existence. Before applying Smilansky’s argument to
environmentalists’ concerns, however, I will present it in its original form.
Smilansky highlights the lamentable fact that humans throughout history have all
too often committed horrific acts of violence against one another.

According to

Smilansky, virtually all humans who exist today, indeed anyone who has ever existed,
should morally prefer not to have been born. Assuming that most people lead relatively
innocuous lives, Smilansky claims that such widespread existential regret should not be
experienced because of what people have done but because of the enormous atrocities
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committed against humanity—such as the Holocaust and the practice of slavery—that
were causally necessary for them to have been born. Derek Parfit (1984) notes that
since even very slight changes in the timing of someone’s conception can result in
entirely distinct arrays of genetic material coming together, any major alterations to
human history would have resulted in the existence of a radically distinct set of
individuals in the present.

It so happens, however, that if, going back millennia,

historical atrocities like the Holocaust and the enslavement of African peoples had not
occurred, the causal chains which led to the existence of virtually all extant humans
would have been broken. Since occurrences like the mass murder, rape, torture,
enslavement, and genocide of innocent humans are inherently bad, anthropocentrists
must prefer a world in which such things did not take place. According to Smilansky,
consequently, if we truly regret historical atrocities and sincerely wish they had never
occurred, then we whose existence depends on the occurrence of these atrocities must
also implicitly wish that we had never been born, despite paradoxically preferring to
exist.
Smilansky claims that this point will be clarified if we ask the following question:
“If it were within one’s power, would one choose to prevent the relevant state of
affairs? This is clearly an important sense of being sorry” (Smilansky 2013:656—657). In
other words, if given the chance to actually right terrible past wrongs causally
connected to one’s existence, one would be willing to do so even if it precluded one’s
existence. Smilansky explains:
Given that we could not realistically expect to exist without the calamities
of history like the Holocaust, we cannot merely say that we prefer for the
12

Holocaust not to have existed, but without being willing to acknowledge
that this implies that we would then not have come to exist. Either one
does not really prefer this, all considered, namely, is not willing to ‘pay
the price of non-existence’, or one does prefer not to have existed, all
considered, and regrets one’s existence in this sense. . . . On the direct
normative level, when we want to ask our question about what we would
prefer if we have to choose, we need to assume that matters stand in an
‘either-or’ relationship: either the calamities of the past are avoided, but
then we do not come to exist, or we do exist, but then the calamities of
the past—which, realistically, are necessary for our coming to be born—
are to remain (ibid.:657, emphasis added).
We can imagine ourselves looking back at someone placed on the verge
of a great historical calamity, and being offered the option of pressing a
button to stop it (at the expense of particular potential people, including
ourselves). There is something hideous about wishing this person not to
press the button, when we know that something like the Holocaust could,
but would thereby not, be prevented. But wishing that that button
would be pressed is equivalent to being sorry that we exist, in the
relevant sense (ibid.:665).
Of course, one could claim that Smilansky’s concern is irrelevant since it is not
possible for us to prevent bad past events from happening.

According to this

consequentialist claim, our moral responsibilities extend only to those entities within
the causal reach of our actions, which are only efficacious in the present or future. So, if
the only morally relevant actions are those that produce effects, we are blameless for
shrugging our shoulders about human history prior to our existence. We should,
therefore, regret our actions or existence only if they have significantly negative effects
on entities in the present or future.

Smilansky claims that the consequentialist

objection to his form of regret is indecisive for at least a couple of reasons.
First, my claim would be interesting even if it applied only to nonconsequentialists. Second, it seems implausible to view human attitudes
and emotions as so closely dependent on future relevance, whatever
one’s position: surely a consequentialist who has lost his best friend to
cancer would be struck by grief, and may well regret things that he did or
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did not do for his friend, while that friend was still alive, even if now
there is ‘no point’ in such regret. It would be similarly implausible to say
that consequentialists ought not to regret the great evils of the past,
which is all that I require in order to get my argument going (ibid.:658—
659).
One may concede this point to Smilansky and still claim that his argument is vacuous.
After all, if we focus on all of the (significantly) morally blameworthy behavior in
humanity’s past that was causally required for our existence, there will be no end to our
regrets. Human history is filled with considerable morally reprehensible behavior. Even
if we ‘corrected’ the wrongs of one atrocity such as the Holocaust, the beings whose
harms would thereby be averted would nevertheless have their own reasons for
preferring nonexistence. For their births, like ours, were causally linked to atrocities of
the past and were thus equally regrettable. So, unless there existed a utopian, Gardenof-Eden beginning to human history, there is no point at which anyone who has ever
existed should be free of Smilanskian regret. If we were faced with the opportunity to
‘correct’ all of “the calamities of history,” it seems that we would in fact be morally
obligated to prevent humans from existing in the first place. Smilansky’s response to
this argument is that his thought experiment is only meant to test our moral intuitions
regarding specific atrocities of the past.
My argument does not, however, depend on a strong claim such as that
only the best possible world is morally acceptable. It suffices that we
recognize that some major instances of evil and suffering could have
been prevented, without making other things worse, overall—but that
this better alternative world would not have included us. We make a
pairwise comparison between a situation where an event like the
Holocaust occurs, and a situation where it does not because, for example,
Hitler is assassinated. Morally, we ought to regret that such an
alternative was not the one actualized (ibid.:661).
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One could still agree with Smilansky that it is regrettable that specific atrocities
like the Holocaust occurred but disagree that one should in principle be willing to
sacrifice oneself in order to correct such wrongs. Even if we have the right to sacrifice
ourselves to prevent enormous calamities from taking place, this right does not permit
us to sacrifice the billions of fellow humans who would also be expunged from existence
by our actions. One’s noble hypothetical act of suicide might turn out to be the largest
atrocity ever committed against humanity. Since almost all of those who currently exist
would consider their lives worth living and would thus prefer to have been born, to
render such beings nonexistent would surely be to commit a tremendous harm against
them. Smilansky considers this objection as well.
Perhaps our perspective, as numerous already-existing, actual persons,
enables us to block the demand to acquiesce in our paying the price of
the undoing of the evils of the past. After all, even after acknowledging
the distinction between being murdered and merely not being born, now
that we are alive, ‘rolling back’ history at our expense, for the sake of
saving the victims of historical catastrophes, seems equivalent—for us—
to our murder: now we exist, and in opting for our not having come to
exist, we cease to exist (ibid.:662—663).
Nevertheless, Smilansky claims that this objection fails since none of us who would be
expunged from existence would ever have been born, so “there would never have been
anyone for whom that could be bad” (ibid.:663). At the same time, it was undeniably
bad for the victims of past atrocities to have been severely wronged. According to the
person-affecting perspective (Parfit 1984), only actual, identifiable persons can be
harmed in a morally relevant sense. Smilansky, however, argues that the personaffecting perspective (that we are only morally obligated to protect the existential rights
of persons who actually exist) cannot be used to reject his proposal because if atrocities
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of the past had been averted, we who exist today would merely have been potential
persons.1 If we have to choose, Smilansky claims, our moral obligations to prevent the
occurrence of major wrongs to actual persons of the past should outweigh our moral
obligations to protect the existential rights of actual persons of the present.
The prevention of the great evils of history, even if it would have been at
our expense, must be morally good, overall. The enormity of physical
suffering and emotional torment involved is such that one cannot resist
the idea that it would have been preferable had history taken a better
course, albeit at our expense. The idea that all of this avoidable historical
awfulness may be accepted, because it leads to our existence, is a
reductio of the person-affecting perspective, in this context. With these
sorts of stakes, the impersonal perspective triumphs. And from the
impersonal perspective, the possibility of our not coming (en masse) into
existence is not morally equivalent to our ‘mass murder’. Major evils are
prevented, and impersonally there is no significant price: it is merely that
a different set of people is born (ibid.:663).
Even if anthropocentrists concede this controversial point to Smilansky, one last
objection to the morally obligatory nature of Smilanskian regret may be decisive.
Although it certainly would have been preferable for victims of historical atrocities like
the Holocaust to have been spared their harms, ‘correcting’ such atrocities would not
prevent future ones from taking place. Since occasional displays of horrific, interspecific
violence occur all too commonly among humans, it seems plausible that the best we
could hope for in ‘correcting’ history would be to exchange past atrocities for future
ones. However, if that is the case, it does not seem rational to argue that we should be
morally required to sacrifice ourselves to bring about such a state of affairs. Regardless

1

Personalists such as Alberto Giubilini (2012) would insist that we would instead be rendered merely
possible persons. The theoretical distinction is briefly discussed in Chapter Two. It should also be noted
that nonanthropocentrists as well as ecological anthropocentrists reject the person-affecting perspective
for reasons that are pointed out in Chapters Two and Three.
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of whether we reject Smilansky’s conclusion, however, his thought experiment remains
insightful and can be applied to the ethical concerns expressed by environmental
philosophers. Also, as Smilansky notes, “Clearly people can be led, by the realization of
the dependence of their existence on the evils of the past, to a stronger determination
to improve the future” (ibid.:659). Although anthropocentrists may reject the idea that
we should be morally obligated to sacrifice ourselves to ‘correct’ major atrocities of the
past, they may nevertheless accept the idea that future, merely possible people should
be willing to ‘sacrifice’ their existence in order to correct the wrongs that we commit in
the present. Accordingly, a different set of future humans with less Smilanskian regret
would come into being.
1.4

Smilanskian Regret Meets Environmental Philosophy
From the perspective of environmentalists, one of the greatest evils of the past

(as well as of the present) is the anthropogenic mass extinction of Earth’s nonhuman
species. I argue in Chapter Three that this is one of the most salient reasons that a
geologic scale is morally relevant. According to paleontologists following Paul Martin
(1967), the most likely cause of the late Pleistocene mass extinction of Earth’s
megafauna was the human practice of overkill.

Ever since our species began its

diaspora out of Africa and Eurasia around 50,000 to 70,000 years ago, its invasion into
novel habitats has been highly correlated with the mass extinction of our planet’s
nonhuman species. From an environmental philosopher’s perspective, these are surely
calamities that ought not to have taken place and therefore provide plausible reasons
for experiencing regret about what our species has done to nonhuman nature.
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If we do not look back to the late Quaternary, we underestimate the rate
of extinction during the presence of humans on the planet. This is no
problem for normal or background extinctions, which sputter along like
the decay of isotopes. Theoretically, background extinction is roughly in
balance with the evolution of new taxa. But extinctions in near time far
exceed background extinctions. Ignoring, for example, the disappearance
around 13,000 years ago of the horses, mammoths, and mastodons that
had been native to North America for tens of millions of years seriously
affects any estimate of the rate of environmental degradation during our
tenure on the planet (Martin 2005:55).
Of course, the pulse of extinctions that began with early humans has continued to
accelerate exponentially as the environmental side effects of human societies have
infiltrated almost every conceivable niche of the biosphere.
What is currently taking place is a gigantic process of destruction
comparable only to the great climatic and cosmic catastrophes that mark
the history of life on earth. Due to the irreversible quality of this process,
many ecologists consider this “quiet process of death” (Ehrlich and
Ehrlich 1981) to be all together one of the most serious and disturbing
symptoms of the ecological crisis (Gorke 2003:205).
Bringing to bear Smilanskian regret, shouldn’t environmental philosophers—at least
those who label themselves nonanthropocentrists—be sorry that Homo sapiens ever
evolved?

In other words, from the moral perspective of such environmentalists,

wouldn’t the Earth be a much better place if humans had never existed? Frederick Ferré
suggests that the nonanthropocentric perspective may compel one to be “ashamed for
the human race, regretting as demonic our presence on the earth” (Ferré 1994:61). If
Homo sapiens had never existed, the anthropogenic mass extinction event would never
have taken place. Indeed, none of the many ecological degradations associated with
our species would have occurred.

Given that the raison d'être of environmental

philosophy is deep concern about such degradations, it seems that they should certainly
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experience a great deal of Smilanskian regret regarding not only their own existence but
that of Homo sapiens at large.
In order to test the moral implications of environmentalists’ confrontation with
Smilanskian regret, I suggest the following thought experiment. Let us imagine that a
pathologically curious, pandimensional being (hereafter referred to as Pandi) is
fascinated by Smilansky’s argument and is keen to determine if any environmental
philosophers would be willing to atone for humanity’s sins against nature by expunging
Homo sapiens from existence. As Smilansky points out, nonanthropocentrists need not
insist on instantiating the best possible world, which would presumably be one free of
suffering—particularly since such a world is hardly conceivable in the light of what we
know about natural selection.

However, a world free of the “cancerous growth”

(Rolston 1996:259) of humanity would be devoid of a great number of massive atrocities
that have befallen nonhumanity. Since humans have committed an inordinately huge
number of atrocities against nonhumans, however, Pandi has decided to focus
specifically on the atrocity of extinction. Pandi has placed before us two enormous,
pandimensional chambers, each of which has been rigged to exterminate whatever is
inside at the push of a button. In the first chamber are all the members of every species
that have ever been extirpated by humans, along with all of the members of the species
that are currently facing extinction. We find ourselves transported into the second
chamber, along with every human who has ever existed, and every primate ancestor
going back to the Miocene. Pandi informs an environmental philosopher that s/he must
choose which beings within the two chambers will be expunged from existence. If s/he
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exhibits genuine Smilanskian regret for humanity’s sins, s/he will push the button that
represents the second chamber, Homo sapiens will never have evolved, and all of the
species that became extinct as a result of humanity will be ‘restored’ to face natural,
nonhuman selection pressures. If the environmental philosopher does not genuinely
regret the existence of Homo sapiens, s/he will push the button that represents the first
chamber.

As a result, nothing will have changed.

All of the species that were

anthropogenically extinguished will remain extinct, and those species that are highly
endangered will continue to face imminent extinction. In hopes of forcing compliance,
Pandi informs the philosopher that if s/he is not willing to choose, the beings within
both chambers will be exterminated.
We will begin by considering the likely response of an anthropocentrist like
Bryan Norton and then consider the likely responses of a few nonanthropocentrists.
Because Norton, like any other ecological anthropocentrist, subscribes to the Axiom of
Future Value (referred to as the AFV throughout the dissertation), his response is fairly
straightforward. He would not likely be willing to cause the extinction of Homo sapiens
at any cost. According to the AFV:
The perpetuation of the human species is a good thing because a
universe containing human consciousness is preferable to one without it.
This value claim implies that current generations must show concern for
future generations. They must take steps to avoid the extinction of the
species and they must provide a reasonably stable resource base so that
future generations will not suffer great deprivation (Norton 1984:143).
According to my definition, anyone other than an egoist who qualifies as
anthropocentric would choose to save humanity in this scenario. Since an egoist may
have his or her own inscrutable, self-serving reasons for choosing to expunge humanity
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from existence, egoists are fundamentally unpredictable.

In all other cases, an

anthropocentrist is someone who exhibits a human-favoring bias such that s/he would
prefer that humans exist even if human existence is inherently ecologically devastating
for a host of nonhuman species.
So which option would a nonanthropocentrist choose in Pandi’s Chamber of
Death? Pandi is keen to discover ecocentrist Holmes Rolston’s response, since he
declares that “a species ought not to be sacrificed on the altar of human mistakes,
regardless of what persons made mistakes where in the complex chains of events”
(Rolston 1998:350). As discussed in Chapter Three, since Rolston argues that humans
who have exceeded their land’s carrying capacity are essentially cells of “cancerous
growth,” and since ecologists now widely claim that humans have overshot the planet’s
carrying capacity, perhaps he would be willing to atone for humanity’s sins. However,
regarding mass extinctions of the geologic past, Rolston claims:
We first think that the catastrophic extinctions were quite a bad thing, an
unlucky disaster. But in fact they were good luck. Indeed, were it not for
such extinctions we humans would not be here, nor would any of the
mammalian complexity. . . . We should think twice before judging these
catastrophic extinctions to be a bad thing (Rolston 1994:48).
Since Rolston accepts mass extinctions of the geologic past because they ultimately led
to the existence of Homo sapiens, it is not likely that he would be willing to sacrifice
humanity’s existence in this scenario. Past mass extinctions such as the end-Permian
event caused by “asteroid impact or volcanism” (Benton and Twitchett 2003:359) were
several orders of magnitude greater than the current, anthropogenic one.
Paleontologists Michael Benton and Richard Twitchett explain:
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Life came close to complete annihilation 251 Mya. A fortunate 5% of
species did, however, survive and understanding how these few taxa
recovered from the severest of evolutionary bottlenecks is crucial to
understanding the subsequent evolution of the biosphere. It took 100
My for global biodiversity at the family level to return to pre-extinction
levels (ibid.:362).
If Rolston has no regrets about such a tremendous loss of nonhuman species for
ultimately human-favoring reasons, he would certainly not experience Smilanskian
regret for the comparative handful of species extirpated by humans since such regret
would morally require him to choose to prevent humans from ever existing.
Perhaps Pandi can solicit a more nonanthropocentric response from Callicott.
After all, Callicott has criticized the sort of response offered by Rolston for exhibiting the
stoic indifference of a holistic rationalist regarding past mass extinctions.
A holistic rationalist could not regret the massive die-off of the late
Cretaceous because it made possible our yet richer mammal-populated
world (Callicott 1989:142).
From the classical rationalistic axiological perspective, the system itself,
classically the cosmos and its various microcosmic sub-systems, often
including human society, was considered valuable per se or at least to
exemplify or instantiate "the Good." In its present adaptation to nonanthropocentric environmental ethics, rational holism would consider the
biosphere as a whole and its several sub-systems, biomes, biocoenoses,
and micro-ecosystems, species, and their populations to be valuable
(Callicott 1984:303).
One may morally decry the very real and imminent prospect of an abrupt,
massive reduction of biotic diversity to be succeeded by a "monoculture" consisting of tens of billions of human beings, their habitations,
their economic cultivars (and the pests thereof), human transportation,
distribution, and communication networks, and little else. However, if
one forthrightly and articulately defends one's considered intuition that
this process of anthropogenic biological impoverishment is objectively
morally wrong by positing organic "richness" (biotic diversity, complexity,
and harmony) as objectively and impersonally good, one might well be
accused of temporal parochialism. Considering our time as but an
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infinitesimal moment in the three and one-half billion year tenure of life
on planet Earth, the present tendency of man to extirpate and eventually
extinguish other species and take over their habitats for himself and his
domesticated symbionts might be viewed quite disinterestedly as but a
brief transitional stage in the Earth's evolutionary Odyssey (Callicott
1984:303—304).
However, Callicott’s reason for criticizing holistic rationalism is that a consistent holistic
rationalist, unlike Rolston, would likewise be disinterested in the extinction of humanity.
Callicott is aware that if humans were to destroy most of the ‘complex’ life forms on
Earth, including themselves, they would eventually be replaced by other living things
that a nonanthropocentrist who embraces holistic rationalism could value no less than
Earth’s current biota.
The deeply felt and widely shared moral intuition that extant non-human
species and the biosphere in its current state have intrinsic value,
therefore, does not seem adequately articulated by holistic rationalism.
There is something valuable, it seems intuitively certain, about our world
(with us in it!) which nevertheless resists reduction to our interests or to
our tastes. For its articulation and explanation this intuition, if it is to
withstand critical examination, will require a moral theory that is at once
humanistic, but not anthropocentric (ibid.:304).
Callicott would therefore reject Pandi’s offer to atone for humanity’s sins as well.
Although Callicott openly professes his humanism, he believes that this does not make
him an anthropocentrist. Callicott defines an anthropocentrist as someone who can
only value nonhumanity instrumentally but allows a humanist to value it intrinsically.
According to my definition, however, a humanist is simply a type of anthropocentrist.
According to simple humanism, all human beings, regardless of whether they lack
person-imbuing traits or are useful to fellow humans, are to be treated as members of
the moral community—that is, they have strong rights to exist. Personalists, on the
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other hand, are anthropocentrists who only grant strong existential rights to entities
that display traits of personhood—that is, they subscribe to the person-affecting
perspective. As discussed in Chapter Two, Callicott formulates priority principles that
adjudicate in favor of humans whenever their existence is at stake. Callicott argues that
“the duties attendant upon citizenship in the biotic community (to preserve its integrity,
stability, and beauty) do not cancel or replace the duties attendant on membership in
the human global village (to respect human rights)” (Callicott 1999:71—72).
Let us finally consider how an egalitarian biocentrist such as Taylor would
respond to Pandi’s dilemma. According to Taylor’s ethics of respect for nature, all (wild)
living things are equally valuable and equally deserving of respect. Knowing this, Pandi
hands him a coin to toss in case it will help him decide. However, since Taylor
subscribes to the principle of species impartiality, perhaps he would give greater weight
to the sheer number of nonhuman species that could be saved from Pandi’s Chamber of
Death.
Our duties toward the Earth’s nonhuman forms of life are grounded on
their status as entities possessing inherent worth. They have a kind of
value that belongs to them by their very nature, and it is this value that
makes it wrong to treat them as if they existed as mere means to human
ends. It is for their sake that their good should be promoted or protected.
Just as humans should be treated with respect, so should they (Taylor
2011:13).
Each being has inherent worth as an individual and must accordingly be
treated with respect, regardless of what species it belongs to. . . . To
harm several such beings . . . is to commit a number of violations of duty,
corresponding to the number of creatures harmed (ibid.:284).
Since the number of anthropogenically extirpated individuals in the first chamber
outnumbers the humans, hominids, and primates in the second chamber, Taylor would
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seemingly be duty-bound to exhibit the Smilanskian regret Pandi is anticipating.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter Two, like Callicott and other nonanthropocentrists,
Taylor formulates priority principles that adjudicate in favor of humanity when it comes
down to an us-or-them scenario.

Regarding his principle of self-defense, Taylor

explains:
When we have a firm sense of our own worth we place intrinsic value on
our existence as persons. Out of self-respect we judge our personhood
to be something worthy of being preserved. At the same time we believe
that we are not inferior in worth to animals or plants. Now if we were to
refrain from defending ourselves against them and so allow them to kill
us, we would be sacrificing our very existence to them. To require such a
sacrifice as a moral duty could only be justified on the ground that they
have greater inherent worth than we do. Assuming that we have no
good reasons for accepting that ground, we may conclude that there is
no validly binding duty on our part to sacrifice ourselves to them. It is
therefore morally permissible for us to defend ourselves against them,
even though they are equal to us in inherent worth (ibid.:268).
Although it may be argued that Taylor’s principle of self-defense does not apply in
Pandi’s Chamber of Death since nonhumans are not acting aggressively against humans,
Smilansky’s form of regret does require us to be willing to sacrifice ourselves “as a moral
duty.” It seems that one could thus interpret Taylor as implying that he would choose to
‘defend’ Homo sapiens from nonexistence in this scenario. Perhaps one could also take
the straightforward defense of human-favoritism expressed by Taylor’s follower, James
Sterba, as a confirmation of this assumption.
Actions that are necessary for meeting one’s basic needs or the basic
needs of other human beings are permissible even when they require
aggressing against the basic needs of animals and plants (Sterba 2001:22).
In addition, if we were to prefer consistently the basic needs of the
members of other species whenever those needs conflicted with our own
(or even if we do so half the time), . . . we would soon be facing
25

extinction, and, fortunately, we have no reason to think that we are
morally required to bring about our own extinction (Sterba 1994:232).
At this point, perhaps Pandi is thinking, “With nonanthropocentrists like these,
who needs anthropocentrists?”

As far as I am aware, there is no environmental

philosopher, anthropocentrist or nonanthropocentrist, who would willingly sacrifice
Homo sapiens in order to ‘restore’ all anthropogenically extirpated or endangered
species to their ‘natural’ state. Only a nonanthropocentrist who genuinely lacks any
human-favoring bias would bite the bullet and correct the sins of humanity. But no such
creatures seem to exist. Moreover, such a nonanthropocentrist would not be deemed
“reasonable” by Norton or by any of the so-called nonanthropocentrists whose
responses we have just considered.
So what should this exercise in Smilanskian regret teach us? In support of
Norton’s convergence hypothesis, there is a very significant amount of agreement
among anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists concerning the extent of their
human-favoritism.

Human-favoritism, like nonhuman-favoritism, runs along a

continuum as to whether it is more individualist or collectivist in character. It is at the
collective end of the continuum, where, not individual humans, but the entire species
Homo sapiens and its ecological requirements are appropriately valued, that the
convergence takes place.
If we were to retread the Pandi though experiment and place individual
nonhumans in one chamber and individual humans in the other, there would be less
convergence. For example, if an endangered black rhinoceros were in the first chamber
and a poverty-stricken Zimbabwean who has exceeded his or her land’s carrying
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capacity were in the second, Holmes Rolston would clearly save the rhinoceros, whereas
all of the other environmental philosophers discussed in the above scenario would save
the human.
Given the fact that rhinos have been so precipitously reduced, given that
the Zimbabwean population is escalating (the average married woman
there desires to have six children), one ought to put the black rhino as a
species first, even if this costs human lives (Rolston 1996:262).
If we were to place various individual nonhumans in both chambers, we should also
expect instances of divergence. For example, Rolston, Callicott, and Norton would all
save an individual from an endangered species if it were paired with an individual from a
heavily populated species, but Taylor would find such a consideration irrelevant.
Because of egalitarian biocentrism’s strict adherence to individualism, Taylor’s position
is ultimately at odds with ecocentrists and ecological anthropocentrists who insist that
we generally have stronger moral obligations to protect ecological collectives.
Although the environmentalist’s application of Smilanskian regret may seem to
have accomplished little more than to highlight one aspect of Norton’s predicted
convergence between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists, I argue in Chapter
Two that it is a more useful tool if it is applied to environmentalists’ concerns about the
future. There I suggest that by employing a not-so-ignorant, intertemporal Rawlsian veil,
the environmentalists identified by Norton’s convergence hypothesis can consider
ecological aspects of various futures that will likely be the result of current and
proposed environmental policies.

I argue that if in a given future scenario such

environmentalists find themselves willing to “press the button” to set things ‘right,’
even at the expense of their own future proxy’s existence, it should be clear to them
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which policies would best promote the rationally defensible interests, preferences, and
values of future humans and which policies would be universally condemned.

Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016
28

Chapter Two: Ecological Anthropocentrism – A New Paradigm
2.1

A Preliminary Defense of Convergence
According

to

Bryan

Norton’s

convergence

hypothesis,

“provided

anthropocentrists consider the full breadth of human values as they unfold into the
indefinite future, and provided nonanthropocentrists endorse a consistent and coherent
version of the view that nature has intrinsic value, all sides may be able to endorse a
common policy direction” (Norton 1997:87). Norton claims that although adherents to
either ism disagree with one another about the role that motives should play in policy
endorsement, they agree when it comes to the consequences that should follow—what
Norton refers to as “protection of the resource base through indefinite time” (Norton
1984:143). He argues that it makes no practical difference whether nonhuman nature is
valued instrumentally as a resource base or intrinsically as a locus of absolute value. If
either perspective is coherently and consistently expressed from a rationally adopted
worldview, it calls for the preservation or conservation of Earth’s species, biodiversity,
ecosystem processes, and so on.
However interesting and important the philosophical question of
whether nonhuman elements of nature have intrinsic value, answers to
this question do not correspond in any direct way to important
disagreements regarding environmental objectives and policies. Longsighted anthropocentrists and ecocentrists tend to adopt more and more
similar policies as scientific evidence is gathered, because both value
systems—and several others as well—point toward the commondenominator
objective
of
protecting
ecological
contexts.
Environmentalists, of course, will continue to disagree about what should
be done in particular situations. (Norton 1991:246).
Norton’s point that needs to be emphasized is that the convergence hypothesis
concerns a generally agreed upon policy direction.
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It does not state that the

anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists identified by the hypothesis will always
endorse the same environmental policies or that their motives will converge.
Disagreements about what should be done in various particular situations are inevitable
among environmentalists with disparate beliefs about ultimate values.

However,

policies that protect larger environmental contexts are largely informed by ecological
and biological sciences that, although admittedly value-laden, are supposed to be free
of the value biases endemic in anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric axiologies. “A
broadly contextualist approach to environmental policy characterizes the emerging
consensus among environmentalists, but the policy consensus is not accidental—it is
forged on the basis of a shared view of science” (ibid.:192). Environmentalists identified
by the convergence hypothesis agree that humans and nonhumans are evolutionarily
continuous and that all life forms require a healthy environment with a stable resource
base in order to flourish. These environmentalists also agree that knowledge gained
from the empirically-grounded earth sciences is an important element of any rationally
adopted worldview.
An instance of the emerging convergence that Norton foresees can be found in
the overlapping policy goals of the diverse environmental groups working to achieve
wetlands habitat protection in North America.

Norton points out that several

anthropocentric groups founded to promote the interests of hunters, anglers, and other
nature-recreation enthusiasts have long endorsed the same policies to protect wetlands
habitats that are endorsed by nonanthropocentric groups founded to protect nature for
its own sake. Although the values embraced by the members of these diverse groups
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are in conflict, this has had no practical bearing on the environmental policies they have
been willing to endorse.
These groups have worked for the same goals for decades and, while
they espouse radically different values and use rhetoric offensive to each
other, they can be expected to continue to support into the indefinite
policy future the expansion of wetlands protection, more stringent limits
on activities that destroy wetlands, and restoration of degraded wetlands.
According to the general picture we have painted of the emerging
consensus among environmentalists, a generally ecological argument has
driven these diverse groups into the same policy camp; whether one likes
wildfowl to shoot at or to look at, whether one touts the rights of birds,
or whether one sees migratory waterfowl as an important part of a
"whole" ecological context, our expanding understanding of ecological
systems enforces on all of these groups the common-denominator
objective of protecting and restoring wetlands habitats on the flyway
corridors (ibid.:201—202).
Still, opponents of Norton’s hypothesis argue that even if a convergence of
desired consequences is granted in some cases, anthropocentric motives will
nevertheless invariably derail most attempts to achieve such consequences on the longterm basis needed since anthropocentrism all too easily permits nonhuman interests to
be overridden. According to nonanthropocentrists, anthropocentric worldviews are
directly responsible for the environmental degradations caused by human societies.
They argue that therefore, human-centered environmental policies cannot effectively
redress the ecological predicament but can instead only make it worse. Because any
form of anthropocentrism ultimately privileges the satisfaction of human preferences or
interests over those of nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are concerned that such
favoritism is “nothing more than the expression of an irrational bias” (Taylor 1981:215)
that implicitly condones behaviors that are ecologically devastating. They insist that
environmental policies must be based on a nonanthropocentric worldview that
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recognizes the intrinsic value or inherent worth of nonhumanity in order to guarantee
that such policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their nonvital interests conflict
with the vital ones of nonhumans. Nonanthropocentrists argue that on the indefinite
timescale during which Norton’s anthropocentrically defined resource base is to be
protected,

divergence

among

anthropocentric

and

nonanthropocentric

environmentalists is more likely than convergence.
Nonanthropocentrists following J. Baird Callicott claim that when nature is solely
instrumentally valued as a resource base—as Callicott presumes to be the case for
Norton—its appraisals are ultimately reducible to human-favoring cost-benefit analyses.
It may be the case that environmentalists with contrary notions of value will endorse
the same policies that protect wetlands habitats, as Norton points out. However,
strictly anthropocentric valuations of such habitats or the species that inhabit them will
be based on aesthetic, recreational, or other utility-promoting characteristics that can
be “quantified in a monetary metric” (Callicott 2009:144). The concern of Callicott and
many other nonanthropocentrists is that an anthropocentric cost-benefit analysis will
eventually reveal that humans would more greatly benefit by converting a ‘protected’
habitat or ecosystem into an industrial, agricultural or residential area. Since the
anthropocentric values in question are open to the same fluctuations as the stock
market, whereas the nonanthropocentric ones will remain constant, any so-called
convergence that takes place will be incidental and short-lived at best. Callicott argues
that purely anthropocentric motives cannot lead to policies that would indefinitely
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protect species, habitats, ecosystems, and so on when such protection provides no
clearly overriding economic benefits to humans.
If something has only instrumental value, its disposition goes to the
highest bidder. If that something is some subsection of nature – say, a
wetland – conservationists must prove that an economic cost-benefit
analysis unequivocally indicates that it has greater value as an amenity
than it has, drained and filled, as a site for a proposed shopping mall. But
if the intrinsic value of wetlands were broadly recognised, then
developers would have to prove that the value to the human community
of the shopping mall was so great as to trump the intrinsic value of the
wetland. The concept of intrinsic value in nature functions politically
much like the concept of human rights. Human rights – to liberty, even
to life – may be over-ridden by considerations of public or aggregate
utility. But in all such cases, the burden of proof for doing so rests not
with the rights holder, but with those who would over-ride human rights.
And the utilitarian threshold for over-riding human rights is pitched very
high indeed (Callicott 2002:14).
What Norton’s critics do not seem to fully appreciate is that the convergence
hypothesis is limited to nonanthropocentric and anthropocentric ideologies that he
considers to be as “coherent,” “reasonably interpreted” and “suitably broad and longsighted” as the “weak” anthropocentrism he defends. Norton argues that in addition to
being based on a rationally defensible worldview, a reasonable and coherent
environmental ethic “cannot be individualistic in the way that standard contemporary
ethical systems are” (Norton 1984:132). Only a highly individualistic and short-sighted
anthropocentrism can condone policies that are based on the satisfaction of individuals’
preferences when it is foreseeable that such policies will be detrimental to the
satisfaction of long-term human interests. In Chapter One, I argued that when it comes
to ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum
according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or
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collectivistic axiologies. Among the ideologies that Norton would characterize as the
most unreasonable and short-sighted are those that are also the most individualistic.
When either anthropocentrism or nonanthropocentrism is reduced to an ideology that
champions above all the interests or preferences of individuals, it is incapable of
informing any coherent policy recommendations concerning the environment. For
example, Paul Taylor’s egalitarian biocentrism, according to which each (wild) organism
has equal inherent worth, could not be consistently or coherently put into practice. If
strictly practiced, even disease-causing microorganisms must be accorded the same
respect and considerations as the organisms they infect.
If we accept the biocentric outlook and have genuine respect for
nature. . ., we remain strictly neutral between predator and prey,
parasite and host, the disease-causing and the diseased. To take sides in
such struggles, to think of them in moral terms as cases of the
maltreatment of innocent victims by evil animals and nasty plants, is to
abandon the attitude of respect for all wild living things. It is to count the
good of some as having greater value than that of others. This is
inconsistent with the fundamental presupposition of the attitude of
respect: that all living things in the natural world have the same inherent
worth (Taylor 2011:178).
In an attempt to make his egalitarian biocentrism coherent, Taylor formulates a set of
priority principles meant to adjudicate the inevitable conflicts of interest that come up
as a result of everyday behaviors like eating, cleaning or grooming. According to the
principle of minimum wrong:
Each being has inherent worth as an individual and must accordingly be
treated with respect, regardless of what species it belongs to. An action
that brings harm to any one such being constitutes a prima facie wrong
from which moral agents have a duty to refrain. To harm several such
beings is not merely to bring about a certain amount of intrinsic disvalue
in the world, to be balanced against whatever value might also be
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produced. It is to commit a number of violations of duty, corresponding
to the number of creatures harmed (ibid.:284).
It is not the aggregate amount of disvalue or harm that is relevant here,
but the number of cases in which one fails to carry out one's duty to
another being. Each entity that is harmed is thereby treated unjustly and
so is wronged. Because the duty of nonmaleficence is owed to each
individual organism, it would be morally unjustified to harm a larger
number of organisms than a smaller number (ibid.:284—285).
In other words, the numbers count. This certainly has interesting implications for the
status of microorganisms. Contrary to the prior claim that parasite and host must be
accorded the same respect, if we must choose between them, the principle of minimum
wrong would almost universally require us to choose in favor of the parasite. Consider,
for example, that bacteria astronomically outnumber the ‘complex’ organisms they
inhabit. As William Grey notes, “There are more e. coli in every human intestine than
there have ever been homo sapiens” (Grey 1993:466). According to Taylor’s most basic
premise, no being is more deserving of existence than any other. However, if humans
respected all living things as equally valuable and equally deserving of life, we could not
engage in simple, everyday activities such as eating, bathing or brushing our teeth. This
would present no small challenge for anyone who wanted to use a nonanthropocentric
“respect for nature” as a basis for generating policies that direct human behavior.
Victoria Davion points out that Taylor’s brand of nonanthropocentrism is utterly
impracticable for this reason. In line with Norton, Davion also suggests that proponents
of such a worldview may inadvertently distract thinkers from reaching a solution to
ecological problems that have been wrongly blamed on anthropocentric attitudes.
The idea that we can meaningfully “revere all life” can make us feel good,
but such empty slogans may do no more than comfort those who say
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them, and alienate those who think they are meaningless platitudes. This
idea may cause needless rifts between people who should be working
together (Davion 2006:125).
It is toward the collective end of the individualism-collectivism continuum—
where individuals, communities, species, habitats, ecosystems, and larger ecological
wholes are appropriately valued—that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place. At
its most collective level, anthropocentrism entails a serious consideration of the
interests, preferences and values of current as well as future members of the species.
Since it is chiefly concerned with the continued existence of humanity into the indefinite
future, its recommended policies will be those that protect the environmental
conditions that promote Homo sapiens’ evolutionary success, which is best measured
on a geologic timescale. 2 Norton thus makes a coherent claim in arguing that policies to
protect the “resource base” will be maintained indefinitely. Similarly, because what
Norton would deem a “reasonably interpreted” version of nonanthropocentrism
generally values larger collectives over individual entities—including species and the
ecosystems they require in order to flourish—its recommended policies will also be
those that attempt to indefinitely protect the “health,” or “integrity,” of the
environment. Nonanthropocentrists typically agree with Laura Westra’s assertion that
“ecological integrity supports. . . the imperative of survival. . . for all, globally” (Westra
1997:291). In other words, according to most nonanthropocentrists, what is good for
nature as a whole is also good for collective humanity. This supposition converges with

2

More will be said about the moral relevance of a geologic timescale in Chapter Three.
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the anthropocentrist’s reverse pronouncement of it that what is good for collective
humanity is also good for nature as a whole.3
Critics of convergence should also keep in mind the distinction that Norton
makes between strong anthropocentrism, which is associated with the satisfaction of
merely felt preferences, and weak anthropocentrism, which is associated with the
satisfaction of considered preferences.
A felt preference is any desire or need of a human individual that can at
least temporarily be sated by some specifiable experience of that
individual. A considered preference is any desire or need that a human
individual would express after careful deliberation, including a judgment
that the desire or need is consistent with a rationally adopted world
view—a world view which includes fully supported scientific theories and
a metaphysical framework interpreting those theories, as well as a set of
rationally supported aesthetic and moral ideals (Norton 1984:134).
Felt preferences, Norton argues, relate exclusively to the preferences and values of
individuals and only coincidentally reflect collective preferences or values. As such,
there is no guarantee that their satisfaction will not be opposed to the long-term,
collective interests or values of humanity.

By contrast, he claims, considered

preferences relate to the preferences and values of collective humanity and reflect the
full range of human preferences and values worthy of rational support. Therefore, the
satisfaction of considered preferences cannot jeopardize collective human interests.
Because the considered preferences of humanity must be ecologically informed, I prefer
the term ecological anthropocentrism to weak anthropocentrism.
3

Ecological

Of course, either statement is highly problematic. If nature as a whole has a good, there may be
innumerable ecological conditions that would be good for nature but bad for humanity. There may also
be innumerable ecological conditions that would be good for collective humanity but bad for a great
many nonhumans. In ecological disturbances and successions, there are always losers that accompany
the winners. The K-T event that heralded the demise of the dinosaurs provides a clear example.
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anthropocentrism

converges

nonanthropocentrism

that

are

with

reasonably

long-sighted

and

interpreted
collectivistic

forms
by

of

endorsing

environmental policies that would promote humanity’s long-term existence over its
extinction.
According to ecological anthropocentrism, environmentalists appropriately
condemn human-centered worldviews that are short-sighted and that permit avoidable
ecological degradations that are foreseeably detrimental to humanity’s long-term
prospects. However, it is not appropriate to simply equate such worldviews with
anthropocentrism since it is possible to maintain an ecologically responsible form of
anthropocentrism.

Along anthropocentrism’s continuum, various forms of egoism,

personalism, and humanism can be legitimately criticized for implicitly or overtly
permitting interactions with the environment that are bad for collective humanity, but
ecological anthropocentrism is free of their most blameworthy characteristics.
Furthermore, what Frederick Ferré refers to as perspectival anthropocentrism is
unavoidable since humans “have no choice but to think as humans, to take a human
point of view even while we try to transcend egoism by cultivating sympathy and
concern for other centres of intrinsic value” (Ferré 1994:72). One may thus legitimately
question whether any form of nonanthropocentrism can offer a coherent alternative at
all—at least as a guide to human action. A genuine form of nonanthropocentrism free
of human biases would likely be unable to provide humans with coherent grounds for
adjudicating in favor of a particular organism, species, or ecosystem over another, or it
might even condone policies that would be aggressively misanthropic. In what follows, I
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will attempt to demonstrate that what Norton would consider a reasonable and
coherent interpretation of nonanthropocentrism shares more commonalities than
differences with ecological anthropocentrism.

In fact, as argued in Chapter One,

because reasonably interpreted forms of nonanthropocentrism favor an Earth inhabited
by humans to one in which humans are eradicated, it may be more appropriate to
consider them self-deprecating attempts at ecological anthropocentrism.
2.2

What’s Wrong with Anthropocentrism? The Standard Arguments
Those who reject anthropocentrism as a basis for environmental ethics typically

claim that it rests upon ontologies and axiologies with problematic, question-begging
assumptions that serve to justify humanity’s exploitation and degradation of
nonhumanity. According to paradigmatic assumptions going back at least to the ancient
Greeks, humans are ontologically and axiologically privileged among Earth’s life forms.
However, in the wake of the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions in science, it seems
bad faith to continue upholding the supernatural assumption that humans are the
measure or measurers of all things. As stated by Paul Taylor:
Now if the groundlessness of the claim that humans are inherently
superior to other species were brought clearly before our minds, we
would not remain intellectually neutral toward that claim but would
reject it as being fundamentally at variance with our total world outlook.
In the absence of any good reasons for holding it, the assertion of human
superiority would then appear simply as the expression of an irrational
and self-serving prejudice that favors one particular species over several
million others (Taylor 1981:217).
Nonanthropocentrists criticize the ontological assumption that humans occupy a place
of central importance in the universe or that humans have privileged access to reality.
They also criticize axiological assumptions associated with anthropocentrism such as
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that humans alone have intrinsic value or that persons alone can be harmed, or morally
wronged.

While these tenets do, indeed, characterize some human-centered

worldviews, they cannot be attributed to all forms of anthropocentrism. Although
ecological anthropocentrism by definition exhibits favoritism toward Homo sapiens,
such favoritism need not be based on the assumption that humans are objectively
superior to, or more intrinsically valuable or cosmically important than, nonhumans. An
ecological anthropocentrist requires no such mysterious reason for exhibiting favoritism
toward humanity and would thus likely agree with Bernard Williams’ assessment that
one’s identity as a human being is reason enough.
Now there are some people who suppose that if in any way we privilege
human beings in our ethical thought, if we think that what happens to
human beings is more important than what happens to other creatures, if
we think that human beings as such have a claim on our attention and
care in all sorts of situations in which other animals have less or no claim
on us, we are implicitly reverting to a belief in the absolute importance of
human beings. They suppose that we are in effect saying, when we
exercise these distinctions between human beings and other creatures,
that human beings are more important, period, than those other
creatures. That objection is simply a mistake. We do not have to be
saying anything of that sort at all. These actions and attitudes need
express no more than the fact that human beings are more important to
us, a fact which is hardly surprising (Williams 2006:139).
According to Norton, the considered preferences of ecological anthropocentrism
are ultimately based on the fundamental belief that a universe with human life and
consciousness in it is preferable to one without them. It is simply the case that a
consistent and sufficiently long-sighted form of anthropocentrism prefers humanity’s
evolutionary success to its failure. Norton argues that such favoritism presupposes the
acceptance of the Axiom of Future Value (AFV).
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The continuance and thriving of the human species (and its evolutionary
successors) is a good thing, and every generation is obliged to do what is
necessary to perpetuate that good. The obligation to perpetuate and
protect the human species is therefore accepted as a fundamental moral
axiom, which exists independently of obligations to individuals (Norton
1991:216).
Because nonanthropocentrists generally express a preference for “our world (with us in
it!)” (Callicott 1984:304) and formulate principles of self-defense and preservation that
justify, with qualifications, humanity’s exploitation and destruction of nonhumanity in
order

for

humans

to

flourish

and

remain

viable,

it

seems

that

most

nonanthropocentrists at least implicitly subscribe to the AFV. A nonanthropocentric
formulation of Norton’s axiom would state that the continuance and thriving of all
species—including Homo sapiens—is a good thing that we are obliged to perpetuate.
Although nonanthropocentric environmentalists differ from animal liberationists by
insisting that we should only be obliged to perpetuate the good of all wild, uncultivated,
or otherwise naturally occurring species, they formulate principles that make exceptions
for Homo sapiens, a heavily domesticated species, to go on existing.
2.3

Anthropocentrism as Ontological Error
Nonanthropocentrists typically insist that our current ecological crisis can be

traced to pervasive ideologies that overinflate humanity’s importance in the grand
scheme of things. Anthropocentrism is commonly criticized for unjustifiably presuming
humans to be the central focus of the universe. Nonanthropocentrists argue that
because of such hubris, human societies have pursued the exploitation of nonhumanity
without much regard for the ecological repercussions. At least since the ancient Greeks,
orthodox ontologies have assumed that human lives have a cosmic significance or
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purpose that is incomparably superior to that of nonhumans. According to Aristotle, for
example, life forms are naturally arranged in a hierarchy according to their apparent teli,
with humans situated at the apex of Earth’s biota as the sole animal whose purpose is to
exercise reason. Aristotle argued that nonhuman organisms’ inability to reason justifies
the conclusion that a large part of their teli is to serve humanity.

Although the

exploitation of nonhumanity would not lead to ecological catastrophe if it were
performed sustainably and with an appropriate appraisal of its ecological impacts, it is
not difficult to understand why many environmental thinkers have been quick to blame
our current ecological predicament on an attitude of self-righteous entitlement to treat
nonhumanity as nothing more than a resource base. Since the human population has
not remained constant over the last couple of millennia but has instead continued to
grow exponentially, our collective exploitation of Earth’s resources has likewise
increased exponentially and is intimately connected to the escalating environmental
problems that threaten our own species’ long-term prospects.
It is true that the Aristotelian worldview was seemingly supplanted with the
advent of the supposition of post-Darwinian science that since evolution has no ultimate
purpose, no life form is objectively higher or lower than any other. It might seem
natural for this supposition to be accompanied by the conviction that no organism is
more entitled to Earth’s resources than any other. However, as pointed out by Jonathan
Balcombe, Aristotle’s influence has been incredibly pervasive.
Since Aristotle first claimed that animals exist to provide humans with
food and other uses, humans have held themselves apart from all other
creatures. Aristotle effectively threw up a great wall between us and
them. Its stones are all the ways that we believe ourselves either unique
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or vastly superior to our animal kin: our language, our tool use, our
culture, our technology, our arts, our intelligence. Its mortar is the
philosophical and religious teachings that grant us inalienable rights,
exclusively give us souls, and paint us in the image of God (Balcombe
2006:25).
Balcombe argues that our everyday anecdotal experiences with animal others, along
with the empirical observations of ethologists regarding animals’ complex behavioral
and mental capacities, bolster the post-Darwinian worldview of evolutionary continuity
and herald that a genuine paradigm shift is underway regarding our commonly held
ontological assumptions.
We must put aside the prejudices we hold towards other creatures. They
are built on two thousand years of pious presumption that humans are
the chosen ones, inexorably walled-off from all the others. Nourished by
the inescapable knowledge that we are evolutionarily continuous with
the other beasts, we are now realizing – from scientific study and
empathic observation – that ours is a planet rich with other minds and
experiences (ibid.:63).
Although many forms of anthropocentrism stubbornly cling to the Aristotelian
notion

of

humanity’s

objective

superiority

and

teleological

entitlement,

anthropocentrism that is ecologically informed can only do so in bad faith. Grey
indicates the extent to which the traditional ontological assumptions have been
repudiated by those within the tradition.
The intellectual history of the past few centuries can be characterized as
pedestal bashing: a succession of successful demolitions of comforting
myths through which we have sought to locate ourselves in the world.
Freud pointed out that Copernicus was only the first in a line of
innovative thinkers who overturned the comforts of a traditional worldview. First, Copernicus effectively displaced humanity from the physical
centre of the universe. A few centuries later Darwin pointed out that
humanity occupied no biologically privileged position. Then Freud
claimed that one of our fondly cherished distinctive characteristics –
rationality – was mostly a sham (Grey 1993:463).
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Norton’s concern to protect the resource base for future humans is not based on the
idea that humans are entitled to these resources or that nonhumanity’s telos is to serve
as a resource base for humanity. It is based on the AFV, which he believes requires no
further justification. As such, the ecological anthropocentrism defended by Norton does
not

commit

the

Aristotelian

ontological

error

commonly

criticized

by

nonanthropocentrists. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, although such an error
may plausibly be associated with overexploitation, it does not necessarily preclude
sustainable exploitation.
2.4

Do Humans Have Privileged Access to Reality?
A closely related ontological assumption associated with anthropocentrism is

that, of all Earth’s life forms, humans alone have genuine access to reality. It is this
access to reality that is supposed to justify the assumption that humans are objectively
superior to nonhumans. For thinkers in the rationalist tradition following Plato, the
world can be divided into two realms—the sensible realm of becoming and the real, or
true, realm of being. Because the realm of the senses is ever-changing and can be
accessed by any viable life form capable of sensation and perception, its worth is
deemed insignificant in comparison to that of the changeless realm of truth that is only
accessed by rational beings.

The capacity for reason supposedly grants humans

privileged access to reality—it enables them to transcend the sensible material world
inhabited by all other things on Earth and apprehend ‘higher’ things like truth, beauty,
and value. Furthermore, transcendental access to reality is presumed to imbue humans
with the absolute worth that, in the rationalist tradition, is required for membership in
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the moral community. One of the most influential thinkers to support this view was
Immanuel Kant, who claimed that we have the universally binding duty to treat all
humans, including ourselves, as ends and never merely as means.
The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the
sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a commission
from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its
interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life
and, where possible, in a future life as well. But he is nevertheless not so
completely an animal as to be indifferent to all that reason says on its
own and to use reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction of his needs
as a sensible being. For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in
worth above mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of
what instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only
a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the
same end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to a
higher end (Kant 1996:189—190).
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they
are beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and
are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons
because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is,
as something that may not be used merely as a means (Kant 1996:79).
For environmentalists who equate nature with the material, sensible world, the
transcendence assumption is interpreted as entailing that humanity’s true place, or
higher end, (as Kant suggests, happiness “in a future life”) is not to be found within
nature but instead, utterly removed from it—that humans are essentially supernatural
beings and are thus fundamentally discontinuous with the rest of Earth’s biota.
Ecologically grounded nonanthropocentrists claim that this has troubling implications
when it comes to environmental policies. The transcendence assumption purportedly
commits those who hold it to an inherently human-favoring axiology. If it is granted
that transcendental access to reality is required for an entity to possess the absolute
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worth or intrinsic value needed to be morally considerable and that only persons are so
qualified, the anthropogenic degradation and exploitation of species, ecosystems, and
so on are not causes for direct moral condemnation unless persons are directly harmed.
Ecological

anthropocentrists

share

many

of

the

same

worries

that

nonanthropocentrists do concerning the objective status of these ontological
assumptions. A biologically and ecologically informed worldview entails that Homo
sapiens is one species among many others and is part of nature rather than apart from it.
According to ecological anthropocentrism, the material world is the real world, and
rational beings cannot transcend it to apprehend a truer one, whether by mental
acrobatics or by some other means. No being’s access to reality is more genuine than
another’s, despite the vast differences that may exist regarding their knowledge of
reality. According to an ecologically and biologically grounded view, the access that
beings have to reality by means of sensation and perception differs not in kind but by
degrees. Humans are certainly more knowledgeable than nonhumans about aspects of
reality that are deemed important by humans. However, this does not justify any
assumption that humans are therefore more cosmically important than nonhumans.
Ecological anthropocentrists do not require the transcendence assumption to justify the
ethical favoritism they exhibit toward humans.

The AFV does not favor entities

according to their knowledge of reality but on the basis of their humanity or the degree
to which their existence promotes the satisfaction of humanity’s considered preferences.
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2.5

Anthropocentrism as Axiological Error
Consensus on post-Darwinian and post-Copernican suppositions of humanity’s

place in nature and in the universe makes it easy to dismiss the ontological errors
associated with traditional forms of anthropocentrism. As Tim Hayward astutely notes,
however, such dismissal does not adequately address the assumption presumed to
follow such errors that only humans are morally considerable.
Now while the ontological assumption is consistent with, and may even
seem to support, the ethical view that only humans are of ethical value, it
does not strictly entail it; conversely, one could hold that ethical view
without subscribing to an anthropocentric ontology. Therefore, the
reasons there may be for refusing an anthropocentric ontology do not
necessarily have any direct bearing on anthropocentrism in ethics.
Criticism of the latter, therefore, cannot borrow force or credibility from
criticisms of the former. An independent account is required of why
anthropocentrism in ethics is wrong, and, indeed, what it means to
overcome anthropocentrism in ethics (Hayward 1997:51).
Anthropocentrically-based

environmental

policies

are

presumed

by

many

nonanthropocentrists to hierarchically attribute intrinsic value to humans such that
humans are afforded existential rights, privileges, and protections denied to nonhumans.
Nonanthropocentrists who hold this view assume that without being ascribed intrinsic
value, an entity will not be acknowledged to have a good or interests of its own that
entities with intrinsic value are required to recognize. Since according to most ethical
frameworks—including ones typically proffered by nonanthropocentrists—an entity
lacking intrinsic value is not believed to be morally considerable in or for itself, any
rights it may be granted to exist will be easily overridden by the incomparably stronger
rights of intrinsically valuable entities to use it as a means.

According to

nonanthropocentrists, since on anthropocentric views all nonhuman aspects of the
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environment, biotic or abiotic, are of merely instrumental value and are viewed as a
resource base, their exploitation and utilization in the pursuit of human ends are
deemed justifiable—regardless of how frivolous those ends may be—as long as the
costs are bearable. The pervasiveness of such views purportedly accounts for the
widespread adoption of environmental policies that have collectively facilitated radical
ecosystem transformations on a mounting, global scale and the ongoing mass extinction
of Earth’s biota as well as the overuse of toxic and limited resources.
Callicott claims that the emergence of environmental ethics in response to
humanity’s ecological predicament represents a paradigm shift in moral philosophy.
According to Callicott, the paradigm shift, as was foreseen by Aldo Leopold, entails an
expansion of the entities acknowledged by traditional ethics to have intrinsic value.
Callicott argues that insofar as traditional ethical frameworks anthropocentrically limit
their attributions of intrinsic value to humanity, they fail to provide moral reasons for
criticizing humanity’s ecologically irresponsible behaviors. Although Norton’s brand of
anthropocentrism provides plenty of practical reasons to criticize such behaviors,
Callicott considers such reasons a betrayal of “the revolutionary aspirations of
theoretical environmental ethics,” (Callicott 1984:299) the focus of which should be “to
provide theoretical grounds for the moral standing or moral considerability of nonhuman natural entities, natural communities, or nature as a whole” (ibid.:300).
There is something clearly morally wrong about this human assault on
non-human forms of life and natural systems. Normal (anthropocentric)
moral theory, however, can only explicate this intuitively felt wrongness
in terms of actual and potential losses of natural resources (either
material or spiritual) and disruption of natural services. But there seems
to be something wrong about the radical destruction of non-human life
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on Earth and/or the ubiquitous replacement by human beings and human
symbionts of non-human forms of life that goes beyond the
diminishment of natural aesthetic amenities, or the loss of medical or
other resources, or even the destabilization of the human life support
system, "Spaceship Earth," (as sometimes it is called from a subconscious
anthropocentric point of view) (ibid.:300).
Holmes Rolston expresses a similar disdain for Norton’s refusal to ground his
environmental ethic on the notion that nonhuman nature has intrinsic value. Although
Rolston admits that “Norton is likely right enough often enough that saving species as
resources. . . makes good anthropocentric sense in setting national policy” (Rolston
2009:99), he accuses Norton’s anthropocentric motives of being morally impure.
The goods sought curve back in on ourselves, and no matter how much
we enlarge the circle with increasing enlightenment, eventually the curve
comes back to us and reveals the underlying motivation as self-interest,
something less than fully moral (Rolston 2009:99).
Although Callicott and Rolston reject Norton’s convergence hypothesis, it seems
that they do so more on the basis of his presumably “less than fully moral” motives than
because of the environmental policies that would be endorsed by his anthropocentrism.
By attributing greater intrinsic value to wild species and the habitats they require in
order to remain wild, Callicott and Rolston would tend to condone the same
environmental policies as the ecological anthropocentrism defended by Norton. Even
from a purely instrumental valuation of nature, it can be determined that humans
should prefer a biosphere that maintains the health and viability of Earth’s current biota
since the costs of its degradation would be too high for humans in the long run. From a
nonanthropocentric perspective that intrinsically values nature, the emphasis merely
shifts such that it is noted that both humans and wild nonhumans will benefit from a
49

healthy biosphere and that the costs of its degradation, or loss of intrinsic value, would
be too high for both.
2.6

How Effective Is the Concept of Intrinsic Value on Our Behaviors?
According to Callicott, because of the widespread belief in the developed world

that humans are intrinsically valuable, our policies ensure that we treat fellow humans
as ends with a good of their own—regardless of what little instrumental value they may
have for us. He argues that the intrinsic valuation of humanity has had the practical
effect of instilling in us a strong belief in human rights. Without such a concept, we
would purportedly treat one another as mere objects.
If anthropocentric intrinsic value were not publicly recognized and legally
institutionalized, we would simply dispose of one another—when that
time comes—as we discard things that are of value solely instrumentally,
such as broken tools, junk cars, and withered house plants (Callicott
2009:143—144).
Nonanthropocentrists like Callicott believe that if the intrinsic valuation of nonhumanity
were just as common, our environmental policies would ensure that we treat it with the
same respect we show to fellow humans.
One problem with Callicott’s line of reasoning is that, in spite of our presumably
universal respect for the intrinsic value of humanity, we have plenty of policies and
practices that permit us either to treat fellow humans as means only or to ignore their
vital needs. Abortion, for example, is a widely accepted practice in the environmentally
sensitive, developed world and involves disposing of a human in much the same way
that “broken tools, junk cars” and other instrumentally valued things are discarded.
Also, in spite of the fact that there are millions of fellow humans suffering from poverty,
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disease, and other misfortunes whose suffering could be greatly alleviated by our
collective actions, our policies permit us to ignore their plight.4 If attributions of
intrinsic value do not help protect or preserve humans on a global scale, on what basis
should we believe they will radically alter our interactions with the environment, which
encompasses the entire planet?

Callicott notes that human rights to life can be

overridden by utilitarian considerations but that the threshold for overriding these
rights is “very high indeed.” It is true that, except for cases involving fetuses in the early
stages of development, our policies enforce negative duties to avoid unjustifiably
harming fellow humans.

However, our policies do not enforce positive duties to

preserve or protect the lives of fellow humans apart from in those circumstances in
which we are broadly recognized to be responsible for their care. Such circumstances
are typically familial. Thus, the human right to life, which is presumably based on the
notion of humanity’s intrinsic value, is more easily overridden than Callicott suggests.
Besides, racism, sexism, xenophobia, classism, and other institutionalized forms of
human devaluation are still prevalent in modern societies even though Callicott assumes
that universal acknowledgement of humanity’s intrinsic value means such societies are
ready for the next evolutionary step in morality—to embrace the land ethic, or
nonanthropocentrism. If such societies are overtly influenced by an anthropocentric
axiology that values humanity intrinsically, it is problematic to assert that
anthropocentrism pertains solely to their members’ negative interactions with the

4

I return to this topic in Chapter Three.
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environment but not to their negative interactions with one another or to their lack of
concern for other humans separated from them by space and time.
Both intrinsic and instrumental valuations are expressed in various degrees
according to a valuer’s context, and things that are considered instrumentally valuable
are often afforded greater rights, privileges, and protections than things that are
purportedly intrinsically valuable. For example, pet owners who believe that humans
alone are intrinsically valuable still tend to favor preserving the lives of their pets over
the lives of humans with whom, through the vicissitudes of the natural lottery, they are
unacquainted. The nonanthropocentric critique, however, cannot adequately explain
why vast numbers of people—presumed to be under the sway of an anthropocentrism
that values humans intrinsically but nonhumans instrumentally—so readily purchase
food and luxury items for their pets while disregarding fellow humans who are
undernourished, abandoned, or impoverished. Indeed, as research by Sena De Silva and
Giovanni Turchini indicates, consumers in the West expend a tremendous amount of
resources on their pets that we might think would instead be spent on fellow humans if
a belief in humanity’s intrinsic value in fact accounted for their behavior.
The market for pet food and pet care products has been reported to be
growing at an annual average rate of 4% in value terms and reached
US$49 billion in 2003, with pet food representing about 80% of the global
pet industry market. Recent market research also reported that the pet
food market has been experiencing a trend towards premium and superpremium products. It has been hypothesized that pet owners are
treating their companions progressively more as a family member, and
consequently, expenditure on pet food is growing. Premium and superpremium cat food often include high content of chopped or whole forage
fish such as pilchard and sardines, and in some instances even tuna (De
Silva and Turchini 2008:460-461).
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The central issue is not an advocacy of pets versus aquaculture or other
agricultural/animal husbandry activities, but the need for a more
objective and a pragmatic approach to the use of a limited and a
decreasing biological resource, for human benefit (ibid.:465).
Of course, not all who are human-centered are pet lovers. Anthropocentrists
who appeal to humanity’s intrinsic value and consistently favor humans over
nonhumans may nevertheless disagree about whether the ultimate locus of such value
is genetic humanity or personhood. If the locus of value is genetic humanity, as it is for
simple humanism, then fetuses and humans declared brain dead are just as intrinsically
valuable as any fully functioning human is. If, by contrast, what is intrinsically valuable is
personhood—a cluster concept of such ideal human traits as sentience, self-awareness,
abstract linguistic communication, autonomy, moral agency, and so on—then there are
plenty of humans who lack intrinsic value altogether, some have more intrinsic value
than others (by virtue of having either more traits characteristic of personhood or some
traits to a greater degree), and some nonhumans might have intrinsic value comparable
to or surpassing that of humans.
If the policies that permit abortion are based on the concept of intrinsic value, it
is the intrinsic value of persons rather than of humans since these policies imply that the
rights, interests, or preferences of persons outweigh those of humans and in the case of
actual persons trump those of persons who do not yet exist. For personalists such as
Alberto Giubilini, although fetuses and infants are already actual humans, they can only
count as potential persons—“people who will exist, unless we perform some act, for
example, an abortion, or unless something naturally happens that causes [them] to die”
(Giubilini 2012:50). Every embryo, fetus and infant on the planet is accordingly a
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potential person with merely potential rights to exist. Because they lack the cluster of
traits required for personhood, they cannot be harmed by anything that we do. Possible
persons, on the other hand, do not actually exist but are merely theoretical—“people
who will exist, provided that some action is performed, such as fecundation of an ovum,”
(ibid.:50) or that something natural happens that causes them to exist. Since possible
persons lack any traits of personhood, they cannot be harmed by our actions, either.
Giubilini is aware that his argument could be construed as implying that we
should not have any obligations to persons of the distant future. For example, we need
not worry about the environmental conditions they will face as a result of our current
behaviors. Since they do not exist and cannot be harmed by us, any sacrifices we make
on their behalf to preserve or protect a ‘healthy’ biosphere with a stable resource base
would presumably be supererogatory. In order to avoid dealing with such implications,
Giubilini defines future persons thusly.
By “future people” I simply mean people who do not exist yet and who
will exist in a time distant from now, regardless of what choices we make
now. For example, the people who will inhabit this world in the year
2150 are to be considered “future people,” even though we do not know
who they will be. In the same way, the son a woman will have, if she has
any son at all in the future, is a “future person.” The expression “future
people” can be taken as equivalent to the expression “actual people of
the future” (ibid.:50).
By conceiving of future persons as “actual people of the future,” Giubilini places them in
the same moral category as actual persons of the present. Thus, he can claim that if we
have obligations to maintain a healthy resource base for current persons, we have
similar obligations to do so for those in the future. Giubilini defines future people as
those who will exist “regardless of what choices we make now.” However, we should
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not be fooled by his definitional sleight of hand since it fails to appreciate the key insight
from Derek Parfit’s paradox that people who exist in the future will do so precisely
because of the choices we make now. Even slight alterations in the meetings of future
breeding pairs (which will be determined by the choices we make now) will result in
entirely different offspring with unique genetic, phenotypic, and ontogenetic
characteristics. In this regard, future persons are possible persons. They ‘exist’ in a
more distant future, but this should not grant them more actuality than is granted to
possible persons who are temporally closer to us. If anything, their status as persons
should be less actual since the details of their existence are less foreseeable. Although
environmentalists may disagree about whether or not nonhumans should be
intrinsically valued, they converge on an insistence that entities in the future should be
fairly represented in our moral deliberations. It is for this reason that the personaffecting bias as expressed by Giubilini would not provide a coherent basis for informing
environmental policies.
2.7

The Person-Affecting Intuition and Parfit’s Paradox
According to the person-affecting bias, or intuition, if an action or policy is to be

construed as good or bad in a morally relevant sense, it must at least be good or bad for
some person. In other words, only persons can be harmed. An entity must therefore
express, or in a less restrictive sense, be capable of expressing, personhood if it is to gain
full admittance to the moral community. Although some personalists are willing to
recognize personhood in nonhumans, there is much controversy concerning whether or
not there are in fact any nonhuman persons, and the number of nonhumans that qualify
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as potential candidates for personhood is miniscule. Thus in practice, the bias almost
universally picks out the set of humans who have the relevant cluster of person-imbuing
traits. Nonanthropocentrists reject the notion that persons alone can be harmed on the
grounds that nonhuman aspects of Earth have a good of their own which can be
violated by humans. According to Callicott, for example, harms are committed when
humans thwart the ‘normal’ existential trajectory of ‘natural’ kinds of being. “A thing is
right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal
scales.

It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Callicott 1999:138).

For example,

regardless of whether or not their members exhibit any personalistic traits, species are
harmed when they are anthropogenically extirpated at rates that exceed the natural,
background rate of extinction. Because the person-affecting bias does not recognize
such harms, nonanthropocentrists claim, it cannot serve as the basis of a reasonable
environmental policy.
Despite this point, it should be noted that membership in humanity’s moral
community is not required in order for an entity to be granted strong existential rights.
Although a personalist may grant stronger existential rights to organisms that exhibit
personalistic traits, life forms may nevertheless be protected for reasons that are
pragmatically human-serving. Mary Anne Warren explains:
We need to reject fallacious forms of anthropocentrism; but not all forms of
anthropocentrism are fallacious. It is not fallaciously anthropocentric to give
priority in our moral deliberations to living things which are close enough to us in
time and space to be affected by our actions, and close enough that their fate
will affect us or future human generations. Nor is it illegitimate to recognize
stronger moral obligations to those living things which resemble human beings in
morally significant respects. (Warren 1997:44)
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Parfit identifies a deeper problem arising from the person-affecting intuition.
Environmental policies that are person-affecting or otherwise emphasize the rights of
identifiable individuals are only coherent on brief scales of time. Although exercising
our current rights to frivolously and unsustainably consume toxic or limited resources
may foreseeably decrease the quality of life possible for many humans who will likely be
born a few centuries from now, alternative policies that would restrict such rights could,
for all we know, turn out much worse for them. After all, significant alterations to our
current lifestyles will also alter the conditions that will determine whatever future
beings exist.
Suppose that we are choosing between two social or economic policies.
And suppose that, on one of the two policies, the standard of living
would be slightly higher over the next century. This effect implies
another. It is not true that, whichever policy we choose, the same
particular people will exist in the further future. Given the effects of two
such policies on the details of our lives, it would increasingly over time be
true that, on the different policies, people married different people. And,
even in the same marriages, the children would increasingly over time be
conceived at different times. As I have argued, children conceived more
than a month earlier or later would in fact be different children. Since
the choice between our two policies would affect the timing of later
conceptions, some of the people who are later born would owe their
existence to our choice of one of the two policies. If we had chosen the
other policy, these particular people would never have existed. And the
proportion of those later born who owe their existence to our choice
would, like ripples in a pool, steadily grow. We can plausibly assume that,
after three centuries, there would be no one living in our community who
would have been born whichever policy we chose. (It may help to think
about this question: how many of us could truly claim, 'Even if railways
and motor cars had never been invented, I would still have been born'?)
(Parfit 1984:361)
In spite of our current judgment that further ecological degradations would
make the Earth an unfit home for future humans, Parfit argues that many who would
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exist in such a future would deem their lives worth living and would prefer existence
over nonexistence. If policies are based on the interests of future humans such as these,
almost any policy can be justified. Robin Attfield explains:
Our obligations cannot simply consist in advantaging them or in not
harming them, since their very existence would depend on present
choices, and they would not exist otherwise. So we cannot ask whether
one policy or another would harm or benefit them, as there is no possible
alternative impact of our actions on them with which to compare the
quality of life that they are likely to have if we choose policies that bring
them into being. To harm someone has usually been regarded as
implicitly making him or her worse off than he or she would have been
otherwise; but such a person is someone who would not have existed
otherwise, that is, in the absence of these policies. But if this is the case,
then most of such people cannot be harmed (Attfield 2007:365).
Such considerations led Parfit to reject the person-affecting intuition and to claim that
ethical considerations should instead be essentially impersonal. As both Parfit and
Attfield conclude, it would be wise to care about our impacts on the quality of life of
future humans even if such beings presently have no discernible identity and cannot, by
Parfit’s argument, be harmed by what we do. Such concern for the future exemplifies
anthropocentrism at the species level, or ecological anthropocentrism. At the level of
the individual, anthropocentrism devolves into egoism and is thus reduced to
spatiotemporal scales that are only relevant to individuals—typically, no more than a
handful of generations.
Although all forms of anthropocentrism preferentially value humanity, such
preference can be manifested individually or collectively. Ecological anthropocentrism
pluralistically values humanity in its most collective form, at the level of the species.
Roughly speaking, what is ultimately valuable for, good for, or in the interests of a
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species is its long-term evolutionary success. To some extent, such success can be
measured as the species’ persistence in the geologic record. Since the Pleistocene,
Homo sapiens has exhibited impressive geospatial persistence; however, this successful
proliferation has thus far been brief. A sufficiently broad and long-sighted valuation of
the human species entails simultaneously valuing the ecosystems and nonhumans that
will plausibly enable human societies to persist on a geologic scale of time. Even if
ecosystems and nonhumans are thereby only instrumentally valued for promoting longterm human interests, such valuation obstructs policies that permit ecological
degradation.

In fact, it will converge with “reasonably interpreted” forms of

nonanthropocentrism and lead to policies that promote the preservation or
conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity, and so on.
2.8

Implications for the Ineliminability of Perspectival Anthropocentrism
Founders of the emerging branches of environmental and animal philosophy

have been largely united in defining their positions as a condemnation of, and an
attempt to offer alternatives to, the human-centered worldviews that have historically
dominated philosophical narratives.

But even though environmental and animal

philosophers have been highly critical of anthropocentrism, their critiques have
nevertheless reflected human systems of value.

Ultimately, in spite of their

condemnations of human-centered worldviews, they typically find ways to introduce
humanistic or personalistic elements through the back door without considering
themselves human-centered for doing so. This suggests not only that something is
ineliminable about anthropocentrism, but that anthropocentrism itself is not really the
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problem targeted by these thinkers. If so-called nonanthropocentric worldviews are
capable of informing what Norton would consider “reasonable” environmental policies,
it is only because of their human-centered foundation. Callicott, for example, freely
admits that his nonanthropocentrism is humanistic in the sense that “intrinsic value
ultimately depends on humans” (Callicott 1984:305). 5 Like other nonanthropocentrists,
Callicott also formulates second-order priority principles that conveniently adjudicate in
favor of humans in many instances in which their interests conflict with those of
nonhumans.
The land ethic is intended to supplement, not replace, the more
venerable community-based social ethics, in relation to which it is an
accretion or addition. … Choice among which community-related
principle should govern a moral agent’s conduct in a given moral
quandary may be determined by the application of two second-order
principles. The first, SOP-1, requires an agent to give priority to the firstorder principles generated by the more venerable and intimate
community memberships. Thus, when holistic environment-oriented
duties are in direct conflict with individualistic human-oriented duties,
the human-oriented duties take priority. The land ethic is, therefore, not
a case of ecofascism. However, the second second-order principle, SOP-2,
requires an agent to give priority to the stronger interests at issue
(Callicott 1999:75).
Although it would appear that a nonhuman’s basic survival represents a stronger
interest than a human’s desire for meat, Callicott does not argue that humans should
resort to cruelty-free foraging. His second-order principles, in other words, do not seem
to require humans to forego most of the interests, preferences, and values generated by
a strict adherence to their community’s established, human-centered, first-order ethical
5

Callicott later softened this statement somewhat by claiming that value may be “vertebragenic, since
nonhuman animals, all vertebrates at the very least, are conscious and therefore may be said, in the
widest sense of the term, to value things” (Callicott 1992:138). In a recent conversation, Callicott did not
disagree with my suggestion that all organisms that perceive the world may be said to value it.
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principles. Ultimately, “the duties attendant upon citizenship in the biotic community
(to preserve its integrity, stability, and beauty) do not cancel or replace the duties
attendant on membership in the human global village (to respect human rights)”
(ibid.:71—72).
Some thinkers have questioned the overall coherence of a nonanthropocentric
worldview. If humans and what humans care about are not accorded preference, then
on what basis can human individuals or societies adjudicate in favor of one organism,
species, or ecosystem over any other? As Hayward argues, there is a sense in which it is
impossible for a human to formulate a genuinely nonanthropocentric axiology.
As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will
be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a
radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the
adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely
unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a
radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be
arbitrary – because founded on no certain knowledge – but also to be
more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a
matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without
certain warrant for doing so (Hayward 1997:56). 6
According to Grey, if it were possible to rid ourselves of perspectival anthropocentrism,
only stupendous luck would guarantee that our environmental policies were beneficial
to humanity.
Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are
confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we
consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem
with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been

6

The point made here is not that nonhuman values cannot exist independently of humanity. Regardless
of whether or not such values exist, any thoughts a human can entertain about them are inextricably
filtered through a human lens. In other words, human values = values humans have.
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proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of
which are at all congenial to us (Grey 1993:473).
Warren states the problem thusly:
We are not gods but human beings, reasoning about how we ought to
think and act. Our moral theories can only be based upon what we know
and what we care about, or ought to care about. If this makes our
theories anthropocentric, then this much anthropocentrism is inevitable
in any moral theory that is relevant to human actions (Warren, 1997:43).
If a nonanthropocentric perspective were genuinely free of human relatedness,
it would display no preference for environmental conditions that promote human
existence. If nonanthropocentrism is egalitarian, or fair to all aspects of nature, as in
holistic rationalism, it can provide no non-question-begging justification for favoring the
existence of any particular organism, species, or ecological condition rather than
another. Although from an anthropocentric perspective, it is distressing to note that
biotic recoveries can take millions of years after a mass extinction event or that
anthropogenically disturbed ecosystems may never ‘return’ to their pre-disturbance
states, a “suitably broad and long-sighted” nonanthropocentrism would be utterly
indifferent. As ecologists point out, in any ecological disturbance, there are not only
losers but also winners.
Environmental disturbances are often viewed only in terms of their
harmful impacts on the affected species. However, in any disturbance
some species will benefit. If that disturbance is widespread and
persistent, the beneficiary species will expand their range and replace
those that cannot survive (McKinney and Lockwood 1999:450).
Anthropogenic factors that environmentalists construe as destructive to nature can be
seen as creative when viewed in a larger context. After all, we are the result of the
biosphere’s capacity to bounce back from catastrophic events such as those that ended
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the Permian and Cretaceous time periods.

Were it not for massive ecological

disturbances periodically occurring throughout the geologic past, the ecosystems and
species that humans care about and want to protect would never have existed. The
current, human-induced mass extinction event also has a silver lining if viewed from a
holistic rationalist’s nonanthropocentric perspective. While it may be bad for Earth’s
tenured biota, that is only a temporary setback. If we consider that a biotic ‘recovery’
has followed every mass extinction so far, including the end-Permian event that resulted
in a loss of possibly 95% of all species, a similar recovery after the anthropogenic mass
extinction is certainly plausible.
2.9

What Would Genuine Nonanthropocentrism Entail?
What sort of environmental policies would a legitimately nonanthropocentric

axiology entail? Perhaps the strongest support for Norton’s convergence hypothesis is
that in order for the views of nonanthropocentrism to be “reasonably interpreted,” they
must adjudicate in favor of (reasonable) human biases. In other words, they must
already be, in an important sense, anthropocentric. As Grey notes, on the broad
spatiotemporal scale according to which nature, life, the biosphere, and so on are
intrinsically valued as having a good of their own, there do not appear to be grounds for
declaring any particular assemblage of species and ecosystems to be better than
another.
If the concerns for humanity and nonhuman species raised by advocates
of deep ecology are expressed as concerns about the fate of the planet,
then these concerns are misplaced. From a planetary perspective, we
may be entering a phase of mass extinction of the magnitude of the
Cretaceous. For planet Earth that is just another incident in a four and a
half billion year saga. Life will go on – in some guise or other. The
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arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least, will almost
certainly be around for a few billion years more. And with luck and good
management, some of the more complex and interesting creatures, such
as ourselves, may continue for a while longer as well. Of course our
present disruptive and destructive activities are, or should be, of great
concern to us all. But that is a quite properly human concern, expressing
anthropocentric values from an anthropocentric perspective (Grey
1993:468—469).
The fundamental problem is that we can rank preferences only given
some anthropocentric bearings. An austerely ecocentric or biocentric
perspective delivers no determinate answer as to which of the abundant
and wonderfully various unfolding planetary biotas should be preferred
(Grey 1993:470).
A genuinely nonanthropocentric axiology cannot be humanistic in the sense that it
provides priority principles that favor our particular species.
In fact, one could plausibly argue that genuine forms of nonanthropocentrism
would require aggressively misanthropic policies. Consider what would be implied by an
ethic founded on a genuinely nonanthropocentric formulation of the Axiom of Future
Value.
The continuance and thriving of all species (and their evolutionary
successors) is a good thing, and every generation (of humans) is obliged
to do what is necessary to perpetuate that good. The obligation to
perpetuate and protect all species is therefore accepted as a
fundamental moral axiom, which exists independently of obligations to
individuals (adapted from Norton 1991:216).
Notice that since this axiom values all species, Homo sapiens is included. However,
there are at least a couple of reasons that Homo sapiens might not fare so well from any
policies that the axiom would implicitly endorse. If we are obliged to do what is
necessary to ensure that all species continue to exist and to thrive, a conflict of interests
is evident. One could argue that as long as humans exist, it is impossible for all species
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to thrive. The anthropogenic restructuring of Earth’s resources has already precluded
the possibility that many extant nonhuman species will thrive, especially those that have
become endangered as a result of humanity’s presence. Many others have been
displaced from the habitats in which they would ‘naturally’ thrive. If by favoring all
species, it is implied that the greatest number of species should be allowed to exist, the
nonanthropocentric conservationist would likely sacrifice our single species for the
benefit of the rest. Furthermore, nonanthropocentrists typically argue that an adequate
environmental ethic “should provide differential intrinsic value for wild and domestic
organisms and species” (Callicott 1984:304). Since humans are highly domesticated, it
would seem that they should be valued less than the nonhumans that would count as
wild.
If the nonanthropocentrist’s axiom were modified to call for the continuance and
thriving of all wild, undomesticated, and otherwise naturally occurring species, it would
seem that very few, if any, humans could qualify. Perhaps one could argue that the
continuance and thriving of globalized human societies is a necessary evil since they can
develop vaccinations and other medical treatments that will promote the continuance
and thriving of wild nonhumans. This argument would also fail for a couple of reasons.
The “natural” background rate of species extinctions was very low when humans did not
exist, and diseases have almost never been identified as the primary cause of a species’
extinction. On the other hand, because of human encroachment and various other
anthropogenic factors, nonhuman species are disappearing at up to 10,000 times the
natural rate. The number of wild species that human technology could save from
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extinction is incomparably lower than the number that would become extinct as a result
of human technology.

If we were to do what is necessary to perpetuate the

continuance and thriving of all wild species, we should at least be obligated to ‘return’
humanity to a condition of sustainable living. A noted by Lisa Newton, this would
require the planet’s human population to be greatly reduced.
There is a way for human beings to live completely sustainably on this
earth, in a way that leaves no “environmental footprint” at all, and we
did it for millions of years, or at least tens of thousands (depending on
how you set the borders of “we humans”). The life that is totally
environmentally sustainable (that is, can be carried on indefinitely
without compromising its biological support system at all) is called
“foraging,” or “hunting/gathering.” This is the way every species except
the human species lives – whatever nature has provided in the way of
edibles, the creatures find and consume, usually according to patterns
very stable over time. It is not clear how many people the earth could
sustain in this manner; possibly one-tenth of one percent of the number
currently living on the earth, or six million souls. The yield of human food
per acre in the wild is not large, and if several human groups foraged in
the same territory, there could come a time when there would not be
enough for all, and the weaker groups would be crowded out, or driven
off, and would starve. That is the way it happens with every species
other than the human. Eventually, had we remained foragers, the human
population would have spread into all viable zones in numbers that could
be sustained, and the population would have leveled off at about six
million. The story of human life, development, existence, and eventual
extinction, would have followed the pattern of every other species – or at
least, the pattern that every other species would have followed had not
human beings intervened (Newton 2005:2).
Newton does not mention the evidence that links foraging humans with the onset of the
current anthropogenic mass extinction event. As early humans left Africa and Eurasia,
their appearance in novel territories is strongly correlated with the extinction of most of
the large mammalian species along the path of their invasion, suggesting that they
foraged at unsustainable levels. It seems likely that groups of hunter-gatherers could
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only forage sustainably if they were highly educated about ecology and biology and
highly motivated to preserve and conserve all the species affected by their activities. It
also seems likely, however, that humans are far too bored and clever to ever be satisfied
with a foraging lifestyle. Thus, the pipe dream of a ‘return’ to such a lifestyle is, as
Newton admits, simply not feasible.
With these considerations in mind, it may be further argued that
nonanthropocentrists who succeeded at expunging all vestiges of human-favoring
biases might be morally obligated to assist in hastening humanity’s extinction since
humans are so inherently destructive to the biosphere.

Perhaps what ultimately

prevents a nonanthropocentrist such as Paul Taylor from advocating such misanthropy
is that his nominally nonanthropocentric axiology limits moral rights to members of
rational species such as ours. Like Callicott, Taylor also formulates priority principles
that conveniently favor humans when it comes to many conflicts of interest. Taylor
nevertheless clearly states what many environmentalists imply—that Earth’s biotic
communities would be better off if humans weren’t around to mess things up for them.
If, then, the total, final, absolute extermination of our species (by our
own hands?) should take place and if we should not carry all the others
with us into oblivion, not only would the Earth’s community of life
continue to exist, but in all probability its well-being would be enhanced.
Our presence, in short, is not needed. If we were to take the standpoint
of the community and give voice to its true interest, the ending of our sixinch epoch would most likely be greeted with a hearty “Good riddance!”
(Taylor 1981:209).
Holmes Rolston has made the similarly misanthropic claim that any human being is
essentially “a cell of cancerous growth” (Rolston 1996:259) if born into a situation in
which the carrying capacity of his or her habitat has been exceeded or in which s/he
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must compete with an endangered species like the black rhinoceros. If such a human is
indeed cancerous as Rolston suggests, then surely the diagnosis implies, if not demands,
a policy of excision. Of course, since nonanthropocentrists in general avoid adopting the
misanthropy implied by a genuinely nonanthropocentric worldview but instead
anthropocentrically favor an Earth that is inhabited by humans—in spite of the
perceived negative effects of human existence on nature—perhaps their value theories
should be considered deprecatory attempts at ecological anthropocentrism.
2.10

A Not-So-Ignorant Intertemporal Rawlsian Veil
In order to consider what environmental policies would likely be in the interests

of future generations, one must adopt something analogous to John Rawls' veil of
ignorance. Behind the veil, we can determine which present policies are acceptable or
preferable to individuals in various imaginable futures.

In order to avoid Parfit’s

paradox, however, Rawls’ veil must allow for the Smilanskian regret that was discussed
in Chapter One. Parfit notes that even the most rationally indefensible policies will
produce future humans who, because they would not have existed if alternate policies
had been adopted, will consider their lives to be worth living. It will therefore be in
their best interests if the policies that facilitated their existence were unchanged. Of
course, in Rawls’ original formulation, the veil renders its wearer ignorant of what
policies may have led to the wearer’s existence. Rawls’ veil was meant to be a tool for
deciding upon ethical principles that are fair to all rational beings, regardless of where
they exist in space-time. The veil we need is different. What we seek is a veil that will
help to create environmental policies that will be endorsed by rational beings of the
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present and indefinite future.

In Rawls’ formulation of the veil, many of the

characteristics that could be useful in considering what sorts of environmental policies
persons should favor have been removed. Examples are a “conception of the good,” a
“rational plan of life,” and “information as to which generation they belong” (Rawls
1999:118).

The veil we require for environmental policy analysis must have less

ignorance adhering to it.

In the modified Rawlsian intertemporal veil, the

environmentalists identified by Norton’s convergence hypothesis retain their rationally
defensible worldviews, which include an ecologically and biologically grounded
conception of the good, along with a rational plan of life that would necessitate favoring
considered preferences over felt ones. Furthermore, the wearers of the veil must
project themselves into specific imaginable futures and consider what effects on the
environment have resulted because of currently existing or currently proposed
environmental policies. Although it is often stated that we cannot know what future
humans will want or need from us, we can be extremely close to certain that persons of
the future will want and need access to clean air, clean water, unpolluted and fertile soil,
etc. Thus, there are certain policy decisions that we can safely assume almost all future
environmentalists would condone, regardless of how far into the future such persons
are projected. In order to test the strength of Norton’s convergence hypothesis, we
should consider whether behind the veil there is convergence regarding the
environmental policies that would be condemned and condoned by ecological
anthropocentrists and “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists.
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2.11

A Convergence of Smilanskian Regret
Just as we would not have existed without some horrific events occurring in

history, future humans cannot have their existence decoupled from the deplorable
environmental conditions that current humans help bring about. From behind the
modified Rawlsian veil, one thing that future environmentalists with rationally
defensible worldviews will have in common is their moral condemnation of current
humanity's effect on Earth's ecosystems, biodiversity, rates of species extinction,
climate change, and so on. They will undoubtedly provide different reasons for their
moral condemnation. Anthropocentrists, for example, will lament the impoverishment
of the resource base, while nonanthropocentrists will decry the harms done to
anthropogenically extirpated species and degraded ecosystems. Nevertheless, they will
equally consider themselves justified in morally condemning the selfish, short-term
policies of our generation even if alternative policies would have rendered them
nonexistent. As Saul Smilansky suggests, one can test the plausibility of this assumption
by considering one’s attitudes toward a horrific past event that cannot be decoupled
from one’s own existence, such as the Holocaust or the practice of slavery in America.
Insofar as the policies we institute are detrimental to ecosystem stability, biodiversity,
extinction rates, climate change, and so on, we will give future persons reasons to
experience Smilanskian regret. They will regret the deplorable conditions that were
necessary in order for their existence to become actual. It will also be the case that,
even if we act in an environmentally responsible manner, their existence will still be tied
to the same atrocities of the past that we find regrettable. Nevertheless, insofar as they
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condemn what came before us but condone our environmental policies, we at least
avoid adding to their regrets.
If ecological anthropocentrists and “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists put on
the modified Rawlsian veil, they will likely discover that their future counterparts
converge regarding the environmental policies they would universally condone. On the
other hand, we harm ourselves and prevent ourselves from flourishing by engaging in
actions that are universally construed as morally reprehensible by rational
environmentalists of the future.

Perhaps here one finds a negative, contextual

formulation of the categorical imperative. Instead of morally permissible actions being
those that proceed according to maxims that would be condoned by all rational beings
regardless of context, morally permissible actions are those that, considered within their
contexts, would not be condemned by all rational beings—particularly those beings of
the distant future who may be in the best position from which to judge current
environmental policies.
2.12

Does Norton’s Convergence Hypothesis Make Sense?
Norton’s convergence hypothesis makes sense if one keeps in mind that it only

applies to a “sufficiently broad and long-sighted” form of anthropocentrism and a
“reasonably interpreted,” “consistent,” and “coherent” form of nonanthropocentrism.
Insofar as most so-called nonanthropocentrists openly promote humanity’s existence
over its extinction and seek to preserve biospheric stability, biodiversity, and
ecosystemic health for the good of humans and nonhumans alike, their aims are not
significantly different from those of ecological anthropocentrists. Although they may
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occasionally admit the normative incoherence of biocentric or ecocentric egalitarianism
or confess that the Earth would be better off without humans, nonanthropocentrists do
not generally argue that human existence is inherently bad or that humans should
prefer not to exist. However, given the impact of Homo sapiens on Earth’s mostly
nonhuman biota, it is doubtful that a genuinely nonanthropocentric ethic accurately
gives voice to Earth’s nonhuman interests so long as it advocates our species’
continuation over its annihilation. The distinctions that nonanthropocentrists have
highlighted between their worldviews and anthropocentrism in general do not apply to
ecological anthropocentrism. Ecological anthropocentrism does not base its humanfavoring biases on questionable, pre-Darwinian ontological assumptions regarding
humanity’s cosmic significance. Nor does ecological anthropocentrism assume that
humans or even persons alone can be harmed or are intrinsically valuable. It is simply
based on the largely unquestioned belief that a universe in which humans exist is
preferable to one in which they are extinct.
Since the foremost requirement for any viable life form to realize a good life is
for it to have a good environment—one that promotes and ensures the health of the
species (and not merely the health of the individual organism)—it would seem to follow
that, if we wish to ensure a better future for humanity, we should at least be as
concerned for the cumulative effects of our collective behaviors on Earth’s
environments as we are for their immediate effects on current human populations.
Because humans are key biotic components of our planet’s biosphere, whatever
members of our species do to the environment will ultimately impact humanity’s future.
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A naturalistic view of Homo sapiens, insofar as it acknowledges the long-term needs of
our species within the context of its environmental situatedness, evolutionary history,
and dependence upon other life forms, overtly promotes the adoption of humanenvironment interactions that will not overtax or abuse the species, ecosystems, and
resources needed for future human generations to live well on a geologic scale of time.
The policies advocated by such a species-embracing anthropocentrism must be good for
future as well as current humans. Human livelihoods ultimately depend on stable
ecosystem processes, which themselves depend on the complex interactions of diverse
biotic communities scattered around the globe. If Homo sapiens is to persist as a viable
species on a geologic scale of time, it will require environmental conditions that are
conducive to the viability of many nonhuman species as well.

Ecologically

anthropocentric policies will therefore tend to overlap with those advocated by
nonanthropocentric thinkers.

Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016
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Chapter Three: On the Moral Relevance of a Geologic Scale
3.1

The Limitations of an Individualistic Ethic
Whether they consider themselves anthropocentrists or nonanthropocentrists,

environmental thinkers typically agree that orthodox ethical theories are too shortsighted and individualistic to adequately deal with humanity’s ecological predicament.
Although a handful of environmentalists retain fundamentally individualistic axiologies,
most argue that we have (or should have) stronger moral obligations to avoid harming
species, habitats, communities, ecosystems, and so on than we have to avoid harming
individuals. Bryan Norton insists that, in addition to being long-sighted, “an adequate
environmental ethic is distinctive, not by being necessarily nonanthropocentric as many
environmental ethicists have argued or assumed, but, rather, by being nonindividualistic”
(Norton 1984:139). Traditional ethical frameworks are built upon moral principles that
are presumed to be universally applicable to all humans, agents, or rational beings,
regardless of where they exist in space or time. However, the spatiotemporal scale
according to which actions are traditionally morally evaluated does not include all such
beings but is restricted to scales that are experientially relevant to individuals, especially
those that currently exist. Given the brevity of a human lifespan, it may seem that the
actions of any given individual are generally not sufficient to radically alter the
environment or otherwise greatly impact Homo sapiens’ evolutionary success. This
certainly follows if the spatiotemporal scale of moral evaluation is limited to what we as
individuals can directly experience or affect. However, anthropogenic mass extinction,
global warming, and other dystopic features of humanity’s ecological predicament arise
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from collective human action, with effects that are both spatially and temporally farreaching. Actions that appear benign on a short-term scale, if performed by enough
individuals across space and time, cross a threshold and turn out to be collectively
malignant.

Thus, environmentalists emphasize the need to evaluate our actions

according to not only their individual, immediate effects but also their collective, longterm impacts. Humanity’s unchecked exploitation of fossil fuels, for example, generates
untold benefits for many individuals, but it also leads to acid rain and global warming,
each with far-reaching, negative ecological consequences.
Individuals experience life within such tiny slivers of space-time that it is difficult
for them to comprehend the larger ecological contexts of which they are components.
From an ecologically anthropocentric perspective, an individual human belongs to a
series of communities or collectives that are hierarchically nested, the most important
of which is Homo sapiens. Nonanthropocentrically, the most important collective is the
community of life or the biosphere. Although individuals and the communities to which
they belong have highly variable patterns of consumption, with correspondingly variable
impacts on the environment, humanity’s current overall population size, resource
utilization, and global dispersal place Homo sapiens among life forms, such as insects
and microbes, that leave a genuinely global footprint. As Craig Dilworth notes, “The
human population is ‘swarming;’ we are behaving like an r-selected species” (Dilworth
2010:374). R-selected species, or r-strategists, opportunistically fill available niches as a
result of their fecundity and the rapid dispersal of their offspring. Such a species’
‘strategy’ is for its members to produce as many offspring as possible so that enough of
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them will survive whatever unpredictable selection pressures they face and continue
the cycle of mass reproduction. Although individual humans certainly do not reproduce
at the rate of individual r-strategists, Dilworth’s observation concerns the fact that since
the industrial revolution humans have collectively reproduced and dispersed at
exponentially increasing rates. Satellite images of the Earth at night reveal the extent to
which humans have infiltrated the globe. The artificial lights of human habitations wrap
around the planet like glowing impact craters. If we could see time-lapse satellite
images of the Earth over the last couple of centuries, humanity’s global swarming would
look eerily similar to the explosive growth of a bacterial colony within a Petri dish. This
sort of observation has led some environmentalists, such as Holmes Rolston, to label
humanity as pathogenic. Given humanity’s influence on Earth’s long-standing biotic
communities, its function within ecosystems seems to be that of an infestation.
I have argued in the preceding chapters that despite widespread
acknowledgement among nonanthropocentrists that Earth’s “well-being would be
enhanced” (Taylor 1981:209) if the “cancerous growth” of humanity (Rolston 1996:259)
were excised, such thinkers nevertheless converge with anthropocentrists by exhibiting
a preference for “our world (with us in it!)” (Callicott 1984:304). As demonstrated in
Chapter One, nonanthropocentrists typically would not be willing to restore the
biosphere to its ‘natural’ state of integrity, stability, and beauty if, as seems likely, it
required our species’ extinction.

Recall Norton’s insistence that this implies an

acceptance of the Axiom of Future Value (AFV):
The continuance and thriving of the human species (and its evolutionary
successors) is a good thing, and every generation is obliged to do what is
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necessary to perpetuate that good. The obligation to perpetuate and
protect the human species is therefore accepted as a fundamental moral
axiom, which exists independently of obligations to individuals (Norton
1991:216).
Individual humans are not points of singularity but are fundamentally inseparable from
their species and the nested hierarchies of various communities, purely human and
mixed human-nonhuman, to which they belong and without which they could not exist.
A short-sighted anthropocentrist or nonanthropocentrist could reject the AFV and argue
that the only morally relevant hierarchies are those that exist in the present. However,
any rationally defensible ideology that champions the interests, preferences, and values
of a species must expand its concerns to encompass all the species’ members rather
than those that are specifically identifiable—i.e., individuals currently or imminently
existing. Taking into account the interests, preferences, and values of a species also
requires an appropriate valuation of the ecological conditions that promote its longterm evolutionary success. Since the evolutionary success of Homo sapiens and other
megabiotic species that environmentalists are keen to protect can be roughly measured
according to their persistence in the geologic record, environmentalists should call for
human actions to be morally evaluated within the larger context of a geologic
spatiotemporal scale. Individual and collective actions that are foreseeably detrimental
to the long-term stability of “the resource base” (Norton 1984:143) are also those that
jeopardize the evolutionary success of all extant species. If human actions are evaluated
on scales that are short-sighted and individualistic, most humans are essentially
blameless for their role in facilitating the anthropogenic ecological predicament facing
Earth’s present and future beings.
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3.2

Can a Geologic Scale Be Morally Relevant?
Although environmentalists are critical of the individualistic spatiotemporal

scales according to which actions have been traditionally appraised by moral
philosophers, they generally claim, as does anthropocentrist William Grey, that a
geologic scale “is not relevant for reflections about (or the regulation of) human conduct”
(Grey 1993:467). Grey claims that:
If we attempt to step too far outside the scale of the recognizably human,
rather than expanding and enriching our moral horizons we render them
meaningless, or at least almost unrecognizable. The grand perspective of
evolutionary biology provides a reductio ad absurdum of the cluster of
nonanthropocentric ethics which can be found under the label 'deep
ecology'. What deep ecology seeks to promote, and what deep
ecologists seek to condemn, needs to be articulated from a distinctively
human perspective. And this is more than the trivial claim that our
perspectives, values and judgements are necessarily human perspectives,
values and judgements (ibid.:463—464).
Grey argues that temporal extension of moral concern “is intelligible only as long as it
relates to a scale which is recognizably human, and to that extent, anthropocentric. . . .
But that should lead us to extend our concern over centuries, rather than years or
decades” (ibid.:467). Grey assumes that if one adopts a geologic scale to morally
evaluate humanity’s effects on the environment, they will be viewed indifferently. After
all, regardless of how many species humans extinguish or how many habitats they toxify,
given enough time, nature will ‘bounce back’ as it has repeatedly done in the geologic
past following cataclysmic mass extinction events.

Nevertheless, perhaps only a

nonanthropocentrist who embraces what J. Baird Callicott terms holistic rationalism
would exhibit stoic indifference regarding this fact. Those who instead embrace the AFV
have grounds for strongly condemning the short-sighted overexploitation of natural
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resources that otherwise could have sustained our species and enabled it to flourish for
several million years to come.
Grey’s argument against the moral relevance of a geologic scale is echoed by
Callicott, whose amendment to Leopold’s land ethic reads, “A thing is right when it
tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise” (Callicott 1999:138). For Callicott, biotic disturbances
are “normal” if the spatial and temporal scales involved are, as Grey puts it,
“recognizably human,” spanning centuries. Like Grey, Callicott assumes that utilizing a
geologic spatiotemporal scale to morally evaluate human actions ultimately leads to
indifference regarding the current state of the biosphere. Callicott believes that this
indifference can only be avoided if we limit ourselves to maintaining what is ecologically
normal in the present.
Our moral obligations—engendered by our community memberships,
human and biospheric—are delimited by a fairly circumscribed temporal
scale. The geological temporal scale is not morally meaningful. . . . Our
duty is to preserve the species populations of the biotic communities that
exist now. How to define the specious present indicated by the word
now? We must build into it room for change; the world is not static. But
if not the geological scale, upon what scale is it appropriate morally to
evaluate change? An ecological scale, I suggest, calibrated by such
ecological processes as disturbance regimes and succession (Callicott
2002:297).
However, Callicott’s conception of ecological-scale normalcy does not seem to account
for the fact that until quite recently, extinctions occurred on a geologic scale rather than
on an ecological one. Furthermore, normal rates of disturbance and succession cannot
be adequately determined unless a geologic scale is utilized.

Disturbances and

successions that appear normal over a handful of centuries may be construed as
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abnormal if contrasted with those that occur on a much more expansive timescale.
When it comes to environmental ethics, if moral obligations are inextricably associated
with the concept of ecological normalcy, as Callicott insists, then a geologic scale is
relevant to moral evaluations and is thus “morally meaningful” for at least helping to
specify appropriate moral concerns—particularly regarding extinctions.
In order to understand what sorts of changes to an ecosystem or the biosphere
are normal, such changes must be compared to and contrasted with the patterns
ascertained from the geologic record. Biologist Michael McKinney explains:
Comparison of current human impacts on the biosphere to diversity
patterns in the fossil record is essential for conservation biology.
Without some kind of natural baseline, it is impossible to understand the
radical changes being made to our current biosphere by humans.
Examples of crucial baseline parameters include extinction rates, rates of
biotic interchange, extinction selectivity (which taxa are more extinctionprone) during background and mass extinctions, and recovery patterns
following mass extinctions (McKinney 2005:119).
If we had no knowledge of the normal rates at which species have gone extinct in the
geologic past, we would not be so alarmed at the current, abnormal rate of
anthropogenic extinctions. Such knowledge seems to justify environmentalists’ sense of
its wrongness. The ecological scale advocated by both Grey and Callicott would have us
evaluate normalcy on a timescale that covers only a handful of centuries since that is
the timeframe during which disturbance regimes and succession normally take place.
Even if we generously extended Callicott’s ecological timescale to encompass a handful
of millennia, that would not be a sufficient amount of time to register the difference
between the rate of anthropogenic extinctions and the normal background rate. The
geologic record strongly suggests that humans have been extinguishing species at an
80

abnormally high rate for the past 50,000 to 70,000 years. In order to determine how
ecologically abnormal and thus, from Callicott’s perspective, morally wrong the rate of
anthropogenic mass extinctions is, we must adopt a timescale that encompasses
millions of years. Besides, species such as ours typically persist for several million years.
Paleontologist Michael Benton explains:
Extinction is normal. Species do not last forever. Indeed, the average
lifespan of a species is perhaps 5 myr., with a range from 100,000 years
to 15 myr., depending on what you are, whether a microbe or a flowering
plant. Species come and go and, even though the overall diversity of life
still seems to be increasing, there is a steady rate of background, or
normal, extinction. The background rate of extinction may be only 10 to
20% of species per million years—10 or 20 species out of every 100
disappear every million years, which translates to one or two species per
100 every 100,000 years (Benton 2003:135).
Since the geologic record indicates that anatomically modern humans have only existed
for about 200,000 years, our tenure on the planet may have only begun. However, if we
are to go on existing for the several million years that would seemingly be normal for a
species such as ours, we must recognize the importance of indefinitely maintaining a
stable resource base. Among other things, this entails that we must stop degrading
habitats and extirpating species at abnormally high rates. As Grey correctly notes:
A suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral
part of larger systems – that is, correcting the misconception of humanity
as distinct and separate from the natural world – means that
anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to
concern for the nonhuman world. If we value ourselves and our projects,
and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations
will be transmitted to the world (Grey 1993:466).

81

3.3

Are Determinations of Ecological Normalcy Arbitrary?
Without a larger context to serve as a frame of reference, determinations of

ecological normalcy are essentially based on scales confined to what individual humans
can directly observe over no more than a small handful of generations. However, basing
ecological normalcy on such a limited perspective can lead to conservation and
preservation policies that are questionably arbitrary.

The species and ecological

communities that have occupied a geographic region the longest, as evident from
geologic and paleoecological data, should be considered the most normal or natural for
that general location. Environmental policies aimed at maintaining such species and
communities in their ‘natural’ state should thus be far-sighted in terms of conservation,
preservation, or restoration. As Paul and Hazel Delcourt explain, however, this has not
been the case in the United States.
The United States federal government mandates that wilderness areas
and old-growth forests be restored and maintained in their “natural
condition,” defined as that which existed in preColumbian times (before
European American contact in the late 1400s), and therefore supposedly
in a condition that was previously unaffected by human activities. This
land management policy reflects the widely held notion that activities of
prehistoric Native Americans were an insignificant ecological factor
(Delcourt and Delcourt 2004:7).
The widespread notion that the vegetation the pioneers saw represented
the “potential natural vegetation,” that is, the vegetation that would
regenerate in the absence of human influence, became the basis for
guidelines to conserve representative remnants of natural vegetation as
well as for efforts to restore altered vegetation to its natural state
(ibid.:163).
By 200 BP, the landscapes that were previously utilized extensively by
Native Americans had been abandoned and had largely regenerated as
late-successional ecosystems. By the time that most Europeans saw
them, the landscapes of eastern North America appeared to be a
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wilderness. Rather than the forest primeval, however, the vegetation
was composed of secondary stands that had regrown during just one
successional cycle after Native American abandonment (ibid.:163—164).
Nowhere on Earth does the biosphere remain static. As Callicott insists, one
must allow for disturbances and succession when determining the normal composition
of biotic communities. It is also important to understand how ecological disturbances
and successions have helped shape the communities under consideration. From a
broad spatiotemporal perspective, it is clear that the biota that inhabits any particular
space on the planet is constantly in flux as a result of factors such as climate change and
variations in resource availability, although there are also indications that certain areas
are more ‘natural’ for some species than others. Paleoecological, paleontological and
archaeological studies also indicate that humans have left an indelible mark in the
geologic record for at least the past 50,000 to 70,000 years. When Homo sapiens left
Africa and Eurasia, its dispersal into novel territories invariably led to widespread
ecological disturbances and rates of extinction exponentially higher than the geologic,
pre-human, background rates that had been normal for millions of years. The biotic
communities of the Americas, for example, have been utterly transformed by humans
over at least the past 13 millennia. In 1492, “the overall population densities may have
been as high as those of much of fifteenth-century Europe” (ibid.:163). The layout of
plant and animal communities just prior to European contact was the result of the land’s
adaptation to its human inhabitants (who themselves were adapting to the land) and
bore little resemblance to the ‘unspoiled’ wilderness seen by the first humans to arrive
there.

When human population densities were low, Pleistocene megafaunal
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communities thrived. Nonanthropocentrically speaking, the ecosystems were ‘healthy’
and fairly stable, at least for the long periods of time between ice ages. According to
Paul Martin’s overkill hypothesis, the first humans that entered the Americas hunted
most of the large animals to their extinction, one after another.
Around the time Clovis points and other prehistoric artifacts first
appeared, two-thirds of the large animals of North America north of
Mexico suffered explosive extinction. Mexico, Central, and South
America lost even more, including commensals and parasites that
disappeared with their hosts (Martin 2005:51).
At some point, however, humans began to become integrated in a less destructive
manner, perhaps having learned to conserve the animals that were important resources
to them. At any rate, indigenous peoples had learned to take advantage of the land and
selectively managed the forests, plains and riparian zones to promote an abundance of
various plants and animals that could be used for food, shelter, trade, and so on.
However, soon after the established human populations were decimated (perhaps to
10% of their peak size) by the post-Columbian newcomers, the land’s successional
trajectories were greatly altered once again by humans—by the sudden absence of the
former human inhabitants and the abrupt presence of new ones. Of course, the land is
still in a state of potential disequilibrium, its stability made more fluid by anthropogenic
shifts in climate and the constant anthropogenic introduction of invasive species, the
chief of which is Homo sapiens itself. It would thus seem that there is no way to ‘return’
the land to its “natural condition” as long as it is inhabited by humans. However, the
geologic record may help to inform less arbitrary decisions regarding what state of
nature we might feasibly ‘stabilize.’
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If one accepts Norton’s Axiom of Future Value or a reasonably interpreted
nonanthropocentric version (as discussed in Chapter Two), one must acknowledge the
moral relevance of a geologic spatiotemporal scale. By limiting our moral responsibility
to the handful of centuries called for by Callicott’s or Grey’s ecological timescale, we
deny both the ecological impacts our species’ behaviors have had in the geologic past as
well as the impacts they will have in the indefinite future on the evolutionary trajectory
of humans, nonhumans and the biosphere itself.

The ecological impacts of

anthropogenic disturbances such as global warming, biotic homogenization, invasional
meltdown, and mass extinction may be hard to discern from a slowly unfolding scale
that is “recognizably human,” but the persistence of these impacts will be as enormous
on a geologic spatiotemporal scale as those that accompanied the five greatest mass
extinction events of the past 600 million years. While it is also true that on a geologic
scale, new species will eventually emerge after the anthropogenic extinction event, and
biodiversity will likely even surpass pre-extinction-event levels as has been the case with
many past mass extinction events, this will happen long after humans and the species
they care about preserving have gone extinct (as a result of unavoidably destructive
cosmic or geologic events). This fact does not alter the relevance of a geologic scale,
however. If policies are to truly favor the long-term preservation of species that exist
now, as Callicott, Grey and other environmentalists insist, they must be informed by a
consideration of patterns that have occurred throughout the geologic past. It is at the
geologic scale that a species’ evolutionary success and its long-term environmental
needs are most apparent, including the ecosystem processes upon which its survival or
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flourishing likely depends. The continued existence of endangered species in the wild
(as opposed to in zoos) may be short-lived if policies do not aim at conserving or
preserving them for millennia rather than centuries. Along these lines, Martin argues
that we could save elephants (and other endangered animals) from extinction by
‘returning’ these proxy species to the Americas.
Introduction of both Asian and African elephants could . . . restart the
evolution of proboscideans in the New World, where a dozen species
held sway for more than 15 million years before their demise ended longestablished ecological relationships and evolutionary possibilities. The
claim of these giants to an evolutionary future is no less valid than our
own. We can enable them to reinvent their ecology on the continent
that once constituted an important part of their global range (ibid.:209).
Martin’s proposed rewilding project aims at ‘restoring’ (as far as possible) the “natural
conditions” that were disrupted by humans during the late Pleistocene. While this
conception of nature may seem, on a geologic scale, less arbitrary than that of the US
federal government, the ‘restored’ species would be strangers in a strange land. The
ultimate effect of introduced elephants on any remaining species from the Pleistocene
is unclear since these proxy species never existed in the Americas. Nevertheless, Martin
may be correct that such a project would best promote the evolutionary success of
proboscideans since they are so endangered in their ‘native’ lands.
3.4

An Appeal to Ignorance
The nature of our relationship to humans of the distant future is complicated by,

among other things, the amount of ignorance we possess regarding the ecological,
social, political, cultural, and economic conditions that will be in place. Of course, the
more remote the future, the less certain are our predictions. Perhaps a safe, clean,
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inexpensive, sustainable energy source will replace fossil fuels, and scientists will find a
way to reverse the effects of fossil fuels on the environment. Maybe scientists will
discover an inexpensive desalination method that produces no toxic waste. It might
also be that a superbug wipes out 95% of the human population, drastically reducing
humanity’s collective ecological footprint. If any of these possibilities occurred, many
essential elements of expected ecological dystopias would be avoided. As mentioned
earlier, there is also a degree of arbitrariness involved in selecting a state of nature for
preservation since ecosystems are under constant revision. And, as Martin Gorke points
out, universal consensus is not likely to ever exist among humans regarding which
particular ecological conditions are preferable. Thus, it may seem incredibly naïve for
environmentalists to presume to know what sorts of environmental policies humans of
the distant future might consider to have been ideal for themselves or for nonhumanity.
Anthropocentric naturalism is no less illusionary than naturalism that
encompasses all species. Just as different species have different interests
in an ecosystem, we must also expect various ideas from different people
concerning the ecological conditions in which they would prefer to live.
Is it “for humans” most favorable to live in a wild primal forest, a
landscape characterized by small farms, streamlined agricultural areas or
(as it is so euphemistically phrased) a “flourishing industrial landscape”?
It seems obvious that this question can neither be answered by referring
exclusively to ecological relationships nor can an answer be found in a
universally accepted manner (Gorke 2003:57).
Despite our ignorance of an ecological condition universally acceptable for humanity, I
argued in Chapter Two that a not-so-ignorant intertemporal Rawlsian veil tempered
with considerations of Smilanskian regret could be used to evaluate people’s future
attitudes regarding current environmental policies. As long as humanity’s minimal vital
interests—such as unpolluted air, soil, and water, stable ecosystem processes, and so
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on—are indefinitely protected, it is not necessary that every human adopt the same
lifestyle or live in the same ecological conditions.
Ecologically grounded anthropocentrism must allow for a pluralistic conception
of humanity’s good that permits variation in lifestyles and social organizations but
condemns individual or collective behaviors that are immediately or foreseeably
detrimental to species and biotic communities that environmentalists with rationally
defensible worldviews want to conserve or preserve. Behaviors must be appraised
within their contexts. Norton explains what sorts of policies would follow from this
approach:
The contextual approach to environmental management recognizes
constraints based in the dynamic interplay between specific actions (such
as use of CFCs in aerosols or continued unrestrained use of fossil fuels)
and the larger, normally slower-changing context in which those
decisions are implemented. According to contextualism, there exists a
threshold within which individual decisions to use CFC aerosols or burn
fossil fuels will have insignificant impacts on the larger environmental
context, which in these cases we can understand as the atmospheric
envelope surrounding the earth. The atmosphere has significant
resilience and can damp out consequences of the activities in question up
to some point; if, however, major and persistent trends over several
generations (such as accelerating use of fossil fuels since the onset of the
industrial revolution) continue indefinitely, the atmospheric threshold is
exceeded, and the autonomous and slow-changing characteristics of the
atmosphere can undergo rapid change, such as changes in temperature
many times more rapid than those that would normally occur with the
advance and recession of the ice ages. According to this reasoning,
activities that threaten no thresholds raise no ethical questions—they
can be decided freely by individuals on the basis of choice (Norton
1991:210).
We may be ignorant of humanity’s future technological capacities, but we can be
fairly certain of many of the environmental challenges that future humans will face as a
result of anthropogenic factors like global warming, pollution, and the disruption of
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ecosystem processes. The most daunting challenges will likely be due to rising sea levels
because of global warming and the resulting loss of habitable and arable land as well as
fresh water supplies. Indeed, many nations will be utterly submerged, and their human
and nonhuman inhabitants will become environmental refugees. Another challenge
that current generations have taken all too lightly concerns the storage of high-level
nuclear waste from nuclear reactors. When nuclear energy was still an emerging
technology, the U.S. Geological Survey warned of the potential dangers of its waste
products to future humans because of “the uncertainties involved in geologic prediction
for long timespans” (Abbotts 1979:13).
Earth scientists can indicate which sites have been relatively stable in the
geologic past, but they cannot guarantee future stability. Construction of
a repository and emplacement of waste will initiate complex processes
that cannot, at present, be predicted with certainty (ibid.:13).
The concerns expressed by Nobel laureate physicist Hannes Alfvén are also no less
relevant today.
The problem is how to keep radioactive waste in storage until it decays
after hundreds of thousands of years. The deposit must be absolutely
reliable as the quantities of poison are tremendous. It is very difficult to
satisfy these requirements for the simple reason that we have had no
practical experience with such a long term project.
Moreover
permanently guarded storage requires a society with unprecedented
stability (ibid.:14).
If we currently have the capacity to lessen the severity of such challenges but willfully
neglect to do so, our descendants will hold us accountable.

It would be highly

irresponsible for us to ignore these challenges on the assumption that future human
societies will develop the technology to adequately deal with them. Although we may
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appeal to ignorance, such appeals will make us no less responsible for the all-too-real
ecological predicament we carelessly dump at the feet of future humans.
3.5

A Personalist’s Appeal to Ignorance – Regarding Parfit's Paradox
According to the person-affecting intuition discussed in Chapter Two, in order for

harms or benefits to be morally relevant, they must affect persons. As pointed out by
Derek Parfit, since our actions can only directly affect particular (identifiable) persons,
the person-affecting intuition implies that the moral relevance of our actions can only
be relative to those persons currently living or immediately foreseeable through
impending births. 7 Thus, adopting a morally responsible attitude toward persons of the
distant future is an illogical exercise in futility. Although any persons that exist in the
distant future will partially owe their existence to current policies and practices, such
persons are fundamentally unidentifiable and can only be indirectly affected by what
current humans do or fail to do. Coupling the person-affecting principle with the
nonidentity problem, Parfit notes that after a few generations no matter what
environmental policies we choose, whether conservation or depletion of natural
resources, no identifiable persons will be harmed or helped by our actions. If any
persons come to exist in the distant future and prefer existence over nonexistence, then,
since our policies and practices are causally necessary for their existence, whatever we
do or fail to do must be somehow inherently good for them. Paradoxically, even the
disabilities or other misfortunes that future persons may experience as a result of our
7

Of course, some personalists do not consider potential persons, such as fetuses or infants, to be
members of the moral community and argue that such beings cannot be harmed. Alberto Giubilini and
Francesca Minerva (2013), for example, apply this reasoning to argue in favor of infanticide, regardless of
an infant’s health or future prospects.
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environmental policies can be viewed as ultimately propitious since if our policies had
been otherwise, they would not have existed at all. As noted by William Ferraiolo
(2000), only those fortunate enough to exist in the first place can be subject to
misfortunes of any kind.
According to the personalist’s appeal to ignorance, since future persons cannot
be harmed by what we do or fail to do, it seems that any environmental policy—even
one that calls for the frivolous and utter depletion of resources that would be of vital
interest to anyone who might exist beyond a couple of generations—is morally
permissible as long as it causes no harms to currently existing persons. This led Parfit to
conclude that the person-affecting intuition should be rejected. Parfit's dismissal is
based on a more deeply felt, nonpersonal, human-affecting intuition that recognizes
harms to humanity regardless of whether the recipients of such harms are readily
identifiable or not. Because the person-affecting intuition is inherently individualistic,
its spatiotemporal scale is too narrowly confined to adequately deal with long-term
environmental problems such as global warming or mass extinction that affect collective
humanity. If we radically decrease the potential quality of life for future humans
through the overuse of limited or toxic resources, and thereby constrain humanity’s
long-term evolutionary success, we should recognize the harms that are committed and
acknowledge our role in instigating them. If we cause future persons to regard us with
contempt (for filling them with Smilanskian regret, perhaps), we also preclude any
possibility of having what Aristotle deemed flourishing, or excellent, lives. As Thomas
Nagel explains:
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There are goods and evils which are irreducibly relational; they are
features of the relations between a person, with spatial and temporal
boundaries of the usual sort, and circumstances which may not coincide
with him either in space or in time. A man’s life includes much that does
not transpire within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what
happens to him can include much that does not take place within the
boundaries of his life. These boundaries are commonly crossed by the
misfortunes of being deceived, or despised, or betrayed (Nagel 1970:77—
78).
It is likely that if current human societies do not significantly alter their environmental
policies, the ecological legacy we hand over to future humans will be received with a
strong sense of condemnation. If we continue to frivolously deplete toxic and limited
resources, extirpate species, and so on, without adequately considering the long-term
effects, future generations will condemn us as egoistic villains, or moral monsters. The
longer into the future the effects of our ecological irresponsibility persist, the more
monstrous we will appear to our descendants. Since the person-affecting intuition
would lead us to egoistically disregard such concerns, it cannot be the basis for a
coherent environmental ethic.
3.6

Individuals as Complicit Participants in Collective Wrongdoing
Although humans have had significant impacts on the biosphere for millennia,

the most radical changes have coincided with the population explosion that began with
the industrial revolution.

One of the consequences of humanity’s exponential

population growth is an increasingly diluted sense of responsibility among individuals
for the effects of their actions on others who are spatially or temporally remote. Craig
Dilworth notes:
Just as the money economy subverted many of the values of simpler
societies, so did population growth. . . . The excessive increase in the size
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of human groups, by diluting the socially harmful consequences of
immoral actions among millions of untouched and distant individuals, has
allowed immorality to become less easily recognisable than it was in
small primitive groups, in which all the members knew each other and
promptly recognized the actions that could menace the survival of their
communities (Dilworth 2010:374).
When we participate in the large behavioral trends of human societies, such as the
frivolous mass consumption of fossil fuels, we are accomplices to the harms that occur
as a result of our collective actions. We consider ourselves to be beyond reproach,
however, because our individual contributions to the effects of collective action seem
too miniscule to be relevant. Christopher Kutz argues that two commonsense principles
are implicit in most defenses of the individual’s nonresponsibility for harms committed
in cases of collective action: the Individual Difference Principle and the Control Principle.
Individual Difference Principle: (Basis) I am accountable for a harm only
if what I have done made a difference to that harm's occurrence.
(Object) I am accountable only for the difference my action alone makes
to the resulting state of affairs (Kutz 2000:116).
Control Principle: (Basis) I am accountable for a harm's occurrence only
if I could control its occurrence, by producing or preventing it. (Object) I
am accountable only for those harms over whose occurrence I had
control (ibid.:116—117).
In the case of fossil fuels, the above principles imply that the average consumer
cannot be held accountable for any of the harms associated with their mass
consumption. For instance, if humanity’s widespread consumption of fossil fuels is
primarily to blame for global warming, it would still take place even if any particular
extant individual had never existed. The average consumer has no control over whether
or not anthropogenic global warming is taking place. Nor does his or her isolated
consumption of fossil fuels make any practical difference to the severity of global
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warming. Nevertheless, Kutz argues, another commonsense principle, the Principle of
Complicity, overrides the other two principles in making the individual at least partially
responsible for collective-action harms.
The Complicity Principle: (Basis) I am accountable for what others do
when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or harm they cause.
(Object) I am accountable for the harm or wrong we do together,
independently of the actual difference I make (ibid.:122).
Intentional participation in this context is perhaps better described as voluntary
participation. When we freely engage in collective actions that produce harms, we are
complicit regardless of what goals or motives are associated with our actions. Kutz also
recognizes that, while many of us complicitly produce collective-action harms and are
thus morally blameworthy, we do not all share the same culpability. Individuals’ moral
guilt from complicit participation in collective action runs along a continuum, with the
least culpable peripheral agents at one end and the most blameworthy core agents at
the other. Peripheral agents are less aware of the harms that will result from the
collective action they participate in, or, knowing about such harms, they are less willing
to participate. Core agents, on the other hand, are more aware of the harms that will
result from the collective action they participate in, and they are more willing to
participate. It is not the direct consequences of an individual’s actions that matter. As
David Schwartz explains, what morally matters according to the Complicity Principle is
that an agent “intentionally participates in—and thereby adopts the ends of—the
collectivity that together commits the wrongdoing” (Schwartz 2010:72, emphasis added).
It should also be pointed out that perhaps more often than not, the ends, or
consequences, are implicitly rather than explicitly adopted by both the individuals
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involved and the collective itself. Consider, for example, an individual who takes a
shortcut through the grass instead of using the sidewalk.

If enough individuals

collectively take the shortcut, the lawn will be ‘destroyed.’ Beyond a certain threshold,
any given individual who participates in the collective action will have no significant
effect on the end, or consequence, of the collective action.

Nevertheless, each

individual who voluntarily participates is complicit for implicitly adopting the
collectivity’s end, which in this case is the ‘destruction’ of the lawn, despite the fact that,
for argument’s sake, not one of the individuals wishes to ‘destroy’ the lawn. It does not
matter that the explicit intention of each individual may be to get where s/he is going
more quickly. The key points are that each individual who takes the shortcut likely
knows that the shortcut will ‘destroy’ the lawn and that each individual could have used
the sidewalk instead.
In modern, globalized consumer societies, almost every aspect of daily life is
heavily dependent on the consumption of fossil fuels, and virtually no one is ignorant of
the ecological degradations associated with such consumption. Although it is likely that
most consumers are aware that the collective consumption of fossil fuels will have
negative ecological consequences, it is also highly likely that they do not wish such
consequences to result from their behaviors. One may then claim that since they do not
intend to bring about negative consequences, consumers are blameless. However, it is
not the intended consequences of one’s actions that matter according to the Complicity
Principle but one’s voluntary participation in a collective activity that has (or will have)
negative or harmful consequences.

Consumers share moral culpability since they
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voluntarily participate in the mass consumption of fossil fuels in spite of having at least
some knowledge about the negative effects of such consumption. They also have the
freedom, however utterly inconvenient it may be, to avoid consuming fossil fuels—or at
least to drastically reduce the amount of fossil fuels that they participate in consuming.
Among those at the core of blameworthiness, however, are many of the executives of
fossil fuel companies and automobile manufacturers, along with the politicians
responsible for lax mileage and emissions standards. Such individuals are integral to
facilitating an increase in the frivolous consumption of fossil fuels rather than their
reduction or replacement with less harmful alternatives.
3.7

On the Moral Irrelevance of Spatial and Temporal Proximity
One point of convergence among environmentalists is their concern to avoid

what they consider radically dystopic futures.

Although nonanthropocentrists

emphasize our obligations to indefinitely avoid harming nonhumanity, they typically
express the same concern as anthropocentrists to maintain a biosphere that is
hospitable to human flourishing as well. Of course, one does not have to look to the
distant future in order to find humans living in dystopic situations. There are plenty of
people in the world today without access to clean drinking water or reliable food
sources, who must contend with disease, warfare, or extreme poverty. Although we,
the relatively affluent, are aware of their existence and could very easily offer assistance
to some of them, we do not consider ourselves morally blameworthy if we choose not
to. Perhaps this is because the number of sufferers is so great that our individual
contributions of time or money would only affect a tiny fraction of them. As Bernard
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Williams puts it, “It is not an accident or a limitation or a prejudice that we cannot care
equally about all the suffering in the world: it is a condition of our existence and our
sanity” (Williams 2006:147). Peter Singer and James Rachels argue from utilitarian
humanism that we are nevertheless morally culpable since we are able but unwilling to
help at least some of them. According to the moderate version 8 of Singer’s Principle of
Preventing Bad Occurrences:
If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought,
morally, to do it. . . . It makes no moral difference whether the person I
can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name
I shall never know, ten thousand miles away (Singer 1972:231—232).
Both Singer and Rachels challenge the legitimacy of our culturally-ingrained
intuitions about obligations to fellow humans based on factors like spatial proximity.
Although in the past it would have required great sacrifices of time or money to help
those who are geographically distant, globalization and modern technology have
rendered spatial proximity irrelevant. Now, via telephone or computer, we can instantly
donate to local or international aid organizations working to alleviate the suffering of
fellow humans. Spatial proximity is thus not a morally significant factor, although it is
helpful in predicting our behavior. Rachels explains:
It is absurd to suppose that being located at a certain map co-ordinate
entitles one to treatment which one would not merit if situated at a
different longitude or latitude. Of course, if a dying person's location
meant that we could not help, that would excuse us (Rachels 1979:161).
8

I will not discuss the strong version of the principle because it seems “to require reducing ourselves to
the level of marginal utility,” which is “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering
to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift” (Singer 1972:241). Although Singer prefers the
strong version, it can be rejected on the grounds that it would require its adherents to qualify for
sainthood. The moderate version does not require such radical sacrifices.

97

The location of the starving people does make a difference,
psychologically, in how we feel. If there were a starving child in the same
room with us, we could not avoid realizing, in a vivid and disturbing way,
how it is suffering and that it is about to die. Faced with this realization
our consciences probably would not allow us to ignore the child. But if
the dying are far away, it is easy to think of them only abstractly, or to
put them out of our thoughts altogether (ibid.:161).
Rachels goes further by challenging another basic intuition. According to Rachels’
Equivalence Thesis, there are no moral distinctions between killing and letting die. If it
is wrong to actively kill someone, it is equally wrong to passively allow someone to die
who could have a life worth living and whose life could be saved by our actions.
Some philosophers have argued that letting people die is not as bad as
killing them, because in general our 'positive duty' to give aid is weaker
than our 'negative duty' not to do harm. I maintain the opposite: letting
die is just as bad as killing. At first this may seem wildly implausible.
When reminded that people are dying of starvation while we spend
money on trivial things, we may feel a bit guilty, but certainly we do not
feel like murderers. Whether this feature of 'our moral system' is
rationally defensible is, however, another matter (ibid.:159).
Arguing by a similar analogy, Singer points out that if it is wrong for us to ignore a child
drowning in a shallow pond when it is in our power to save the child, it is also wrong for
us to allow fellow humans to starve to death when we can easily do something to save
them. No supererogatory acts are required on our part. By simply foregoing a frivolous
act of participation in consumer society, such as purchasing a bag of potato chips or a
cup of coffee, and instead donating the unused money to a charity, we could help
extend another human’s life, even if only temporarily. The temporary status of such aid
is also irrelevant. Imagine that Pandi (the pandimensional being introduced in Chapter
One) informs us that in saving the drowning child in Singer’s analogy, we could extend
his or her life by only a few hours, since the child will die of unrelated, unavoidable
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natural causes the next day. Such knowledge would not, morally speaking, give us free
reign to ignore the child’s immediate plight. On a geologic scale, human lives are so
brief that any extension, whether measured in days or in decades, prolongs the
inevitable outcome of death by only a trivial margin of time. Nevertheless, because the
child in Singer’s example is deemed to have a life worth living, however brief it may
ultimately be, Singer argues that we are morally obligated to at least consider the child’s
vital interests and do what we can to protect those interests.
According to Singer, “If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability,
equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far
away from us (or we are far away from him)” (Singer 1972:232). Of course, distance can
be measured in both space and time, but one may question whether the two factors are
parallel in a morally significant way. Singer and Rachels argue only that if there are
morally sound reasons for saving fellow humans from dystopic situations, such reasons
do not depend on spatial proximity. I suggest that according to the AFV, they should
not depend on temporal proximity, either. If anthropocentrists should be concerned for
fellow humans that currently exist, regardless of their spatial proximity to us, they
should be equally concerned for those that will exist in the future, regardless of how far
into the future they will exist. 9 As stated previously, personalistic principles limit one’s
moral obligations to identifiable persons, who are typically part of one’s own
communities, thus egoistically limiting the moral community to a tiny fraction of
humanity. Singer and Rachels argue in favor of humanistic principles in which the moral
9

In Chapter One, I discussed Saul Smilansky’s argument against the relevance of temporal proximity.
Smilansky invokes what might be construed as a reversal of the AFV, an Axiom of Past Value.
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community includes all humans on the planet. Accepting the AFV, the community is
expanded to include not only those humans who currently exist but also future
members of our species and our evolutionary descendants. Rachels has a response for
those who would reject such a conclusion on the grounds that it does not conform to
their intuitions. “Rather than being perceptions of the truth, our 'intuitions' might
sometimes signify nothing more than our prejudices or selfishness or cultural
conditioning” (Rachels 1979:160).

Singer acknowledges a much deeper criticism,

however. If no one on the planet were allowed to starve to death, the population crisis
would likely be much more severe than it is at present.
I accept that the earth cannot support indefinitely a population rising at
the present rate. This certainly poses a problem for anyone who thinks it
important to prevent famine. Again, however, one could accept the
argument without drawing the conclusion that it absolves one from any
obligation to do anything to prevent famine. The conclusion that should
be drawn is that the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is
population control (Singer 1972:240).
Ideally, of course, such population control would be coupled with feeding the hungry. If
egoistically or misanthropically interpreted, a call for population control could lead to
ecofascism.
3.8

Lifeboat Earth and the Tragedy of the Commons
Garrett Hardin claims that the humanism expressed by thinkers like Singer and

Rachels would ultimately generate more harms than benefits for humanity. Whereas
Singer and Rachels emphasize our duties to alleviate the suffering of current humans,
Hardin insists that we have stronger duties to protect the resource base for those in the
future. As he puts it, “For posterity’s sake we should never send food to any population
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that is beyond the realistic carrying capacity of its land” (Hardin 1976:131). “Every life
saved this year in a poor country diminishes the quality of life for subsequent
generations” (Hardin 1974:565). Instead of funneling vital resources to those born into
ecologically or economically challenging circumstances, Hardin argues that we should sit
back and allow the carrying capacity of the land to establish sustainable populations.
According to Hardin, since the Earth has a finite amount of resources but an
exponentially growing human population, we are essentially in a lifeboat situation. Thus,
we the wealthy are justified in making self-serving, life-or-death decisions.

The

comparatively wealthy have more than enough resources to consume frivolously and
keep themselves comfortably afloat, whereas the poor lack even the most basic
necessities and must tread water in hopes of being admitted to a well-provisioned
lifeboat or of at least receiving handouts that will enable them to continue treading
water a bit longer. Hardin argues that humanistic sentiments like those of Singer and
Rachels to allow the poor of the world to overrun the lifeboats of the wealthy would be
devastating. “The boat is swamped, and everyone drowns. Complete justice, complete
catastrophe” (ibid.:562). According to Hardin, if the wealthy shared their resources with
all those who are in need, eventually everyone would be in the same wretched
condition of poverty since the poor reproduce at unsustainable rates that are much
higher than those of the wealthy. The wealthy would thereby squander the resources
they could otherwise save for their descendants, ultimately condemning them to tread
water with the rest of humanity. In Hardin’s words:
We cannot safely divide the wealth equitably among all present peoples,
so long as people reproduce at different rates, because to do so would
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guarantee that our grandchildren—everyone's grandchildren—would
have only a ruined world to inhabit (ibid.:567).
In the end, either there would be no resources left to sustain humanity, or there would
be insufficient resources to sustain lives worth living.
Hardin assumes that if the wealthy let the poor fend for themselves, human
populations would roughly stabilize at their habitat’s carrying capacity, as happens in
the case of nonhuman species classified as K-strategists, with cyclical fluctuations as a
result of changing environmental conditions. The human carrying capacity of any
particular area—i.e., that area’s capacity to sustain the lives of its human inhabitants—is
largely determined by the size of its population coupled with the population’s
consumption patterns, cultural practices (including agricultural practices), and so on in
relation to the available resources, climatic conditions, and various other natural
selection pressures. However, Hardin is mainly concerned with the disproportionately
large population size and rate of reproduction of the global poor rather than with the
disproportionately large consumption rate and ecological footprint of the global wealthy.
In other words, Hardin assumes that the size of a population is more critical than the
population’s consumption pattern in determining carrying capacity. Hardin argues that
we must consider the larger ecological context, or situation, in which the poor of the
world find themselves before deciding to help them. For the good of future humans, if
the poor have exceeded the land’s carrying capacity, we should let nature run its course.
The morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time
the act is performed—this is the foundation stone of situationist,
ecological ethics. A time-blind absolute ethical principle like that implied
by the shibboleth, "the sanctity of life," leads to greater suffering than its
situationist, ecological alternative—and ultimately and paradoxically,
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even to a lesser quantity of life over a sufficiently long period of time.
The interests of posterity can be brought into the reckoning of ethics if
we abandon the idea of the sanctity of (present) life as an absolute
ethical ideal, replacing it with the idea of the sanctity of the carrying
capacity (Hardin 1976:133).
Echoing Hardin’s warning that a tragedy of the commons is in the making, many
ecologists claim that humans have already exceeded our planet’s carrying capacity,
having achieved what is referred to as overshoot.
Human activities have exceeded the biosphere’s capacity since the 1980s.
This overshoot can be expressed as the extent to which human area
demand exceeds nature’s supply:
whereas humanity’s load
corresponded to 70% of the biosphere’s capacity in 1961, this percentage
grew to 120% by 1999. In other words, 20% overshoot means that it
would require 1.2 earths, or one earth for 1.2 years, to regenerate what
humanity used in 1999 (Wackernagel et al. 2002:9268).
If humans have indeed achieved overshoot, it is most likely due to the combination of
overpopulation and overconsumption. However, since particular individuals and the
societies to which they belong consume resources at highly different rates, collective
overconsumption seems to be the chief culprit. As people around the world adopt the
high-energy lifestyles of the West, their energy consumption increases substantially.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China recently overtook
the United States to become first in total primary energy consumption. 10 If we also
consider India’s emerging economy and growing population, the prospects for
addressing overshoot appear dire. Consider Stan Cox’s observation that, “If India alone
adopted the consumption pattern typical in the US, the global ecological impact would
be as if the world’s population had doubled” (Cox 2008:114). In order to reverse
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overshoot, either the human population or its unsustainable rates of consumption and
ecologically devastating cultural practices would have to be drastically altered. If all
human lives counted equally and were treated with the regard expressed by Singer and
Rachels, it is the lifestyles of Earth’s wealthy that would be sacrificed. If the ‘quality’ of
human life counted most, as it presumably does for Hardin, then the overpopulated
poor would be allowed to die, or, in Rachels’ terminology, passively euthanized. What
Hardin has not adequately addressed, however, is the irony that without many of the
poor to supply cheap labor for the production of goods and services consumed by the
wealthy, the system of inequality that enables the wealthy to have ‘quality’ lives would
not be possible. Cox explains:
We [in the developed nations] continue to enjoy the high-energy life, and
our economies goad those of less wealthy nations to follow our example.
Then we carp about their having too many people while we take full
advantage of the cheap labor power that those “too many people” can
provide. (ibid.:114—115)
Holmes Rolston offers a nonanthropocentric argument that converges with
Hardin’s future-oriented, anthropocentric, contractarian egoism.

Each foresees a

tragedy of the commons arising if Earth’s resources are fairly distributed among the
poor and the wealthy, and each argues that it is thus sometimes necessary that the lives
of the poor should be sacrificed for the greater good—of humanity for Hardin and of the
Earth for Rolston. They make these claims in spite of the fact that the comparatively
wealthy humans living in industrialized, consumer societies have exponentially larger
ecological and consumer footprints than the global poor and are thus disproportionately
more responsible for accelerating humanity’s ecological predicament. It may appear
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that the wealthy have not exceeded their land’s carrying capacity but only because they
exploit resources from all over the planet and keep their own land at least as ‘green’ as
the law or local custom requires. When it comes to ecological footprints, it takes
roughly 20 average Rwandans to equal the footprint of one average American. In other
words, roughly 20 Rwandans would need to be sacrificed in order to free up sufficient
resources to support the frivolous lifestyle of a single American (BBC 2009). Hardin
justifies the vast disparity that exists between the haves and have-nots by referencing
property laws that were (rather conveniently) written by those whose wealth was
unfairly inherited. “It is literally true that we Americans of non-Indian ancestry are the
descendants of thieves” (Hardin 1974:567). However,
The law long ago invented statutes of limitations to justify the rejection
of pure justice, in the interest of preventing massive disorder. The law
zealously defends property rights—but only recent property rights. It is
as though the physical principle of exponential decay applies to property
rights. Drawing a line in time may be unjust, but any other action is
practically worse (ibid.:567).
Although Rolston acknowledges that the poor have “a right to a more equitable
distribution of the goods of the Earth that we, the wealthy, think we absolutely own”
(Rolston 1996:264), he seems opposed to having such a right fulfilled. Instead, Rolston
echoes the egoism of Hardin’s lifeboat ethic by pessimistically proclaiming, “Even if
there were an equitable distribution of wealth, the human population cannot go on
escalating without people becoming all equally poor” (ibid.:259). Of course, Rolston
does not intend for humanity to live in universal poverty, especially since this would
have a negative impact on the biosphere. He therefore attempts to justify the wealthy’s
disregard of the poor in a manner similar to Hardin’s, by referencing cultural norms.
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Instead of donating to charities to feed the poor, the wealthy typically spend their
excess money on unnecessary things that give them pleasure. Presumably, according to
Rolston, the widespread acceptance of this common practice makes it somehow morally
permissible.
Every time we buy a Christmas gift for a wife or husband, or go to a
symphony concert, or give a college education to a child, or drive a late
model car home, or turn on the air conditioner, we spend money that
might have helped to eradicate poverty. We mostly choose to do things
we value more than feeding the hungry.
An ethicist may reply, yes, that is the fact of the matter. But no
normative ought follows from the description of this behavior. We ought
not to behave so. But such widespread behavior, engaged in almost
universally by persons who regard themselves as being ethical, including
readers of this article, is strong evidence that we in fact not only have
these norms but think we ought to have them. To be sure, we also think
that charity is appropriate, and we censure those who are wholly
insensitive to the plight of others. But we place decisions here on a scale
of degree, and we do not feel guilty about all these other values we
pursue, while yet some people somewhere on earth are starving (ibid.
1996:250).
Robin Attfield argues that Rolston’s appeal to cultural norms seems to undercut
his arguments elsewhere against the status quo. If Rolston’s defense of the wealthy is
based on cultural relativism, he loses grounds upon which to challenge ecologically
irresponsible behaviors that are also commonly practiced and accepted.
More generally, the moral assumptions of behaviour in the contemporary
world cannot be allowed to form the basis of critical normative ethics; for
on this basis it would make no sense to urge that the status quo warrants
criticism and ought to change. Yet this is something which environmental
ethicists usually both want and need to urge (Attfield 1998:292—293).
In response to Attfield and his other critics on this matter, Rolston claims:
One of my main points is that the 'feeding people' gained by 'sacrificing
nature' is, in most cases, only a temporary solution to a problem that
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needs to be solved at its roots in the birthrate patterns or social
inequities that result in hunger. Else, one will find, a decade later, that
the people are hungry again, because the problem was not attacked in
the right place. . . . On this spectacular planet, with many millions of
species, maybe it is astonishing anthropocentrism to hold that people
always come first, no matter what their mistakes, no matter where their
uncontrolled growth (Rolston 1998:352).
I nowhere said that 'we' are guiltless. I did say that 'we' Americans (and
everybody else) sometimes correctly give priority to other values besides
feeding the poor (ibid.:353). . . . I run the risk of being misanthropic; that
is better than to risk being an arrogant humanist (ibid.:356).
Rolston’s argument against helping the poor is specifically addressed to the poor
whose continued existence would likely threaten endangered species by taking away
land or other resources that such species would require. Rolston argues that on the
African continent, where many species such as the black rhinoceros are critically
endangered, there are too many humans interfering with the land’s carrying capacity.
Starkly put, the growth of culture has become cancerous. That is hardly a
metaphor, for a cancer is essentially an explosion of unregulated growth.
Feeding people always seems humane, but, when we face up to what is
really going on, by just feeding people, without attention to the larger
social results, we could be feeding a kind of cancer (Rolston 1996:258—
259).
One can say that where there is a hungry mouth, one should do what it
takes to get food into it. But when there are two mouths there the next
day, and four the day after that, and sixteen the day after that, one needs
a more complex answer. . . . We have to figure in where such persons
are located on the population curve, and realize that a good thing when
human numbers are manageable is no longer a good thing when such a
person is really another cell of cancerous growth. That sounds cruel, and
it is tragic, but it does not cease to be true for these reasons (ibid.:259).
From Rolston’s contextual perspective, a human being is essentially “a cell of cancerous
growth” when s/he has been born into severely economically and ecologically
challenging circumstances. Although the comparatively wealthy are largely to blame for
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the rapidly spreading cancer of environmental degradation, Rolston does not argue that
their demise would improve the evolutionary success of the black rhinoceros or other
endangered species. Endangered species cannot be saved from extinction by the shortterm sacrifice of the poor if the wealthy continue to frivolously squander resources such
that other poor are pressured into situations in which they must compete with such
species in order to survive. In fairness to Rolston, he is generally both a strong defender
of human rights and a harsh critic of consumer society’s effects on the environment.
However, consumers in the developed world may take comfort from his Hardinian
carrying-capacity argument. It seems to imply that they may continue living in denial of
their complicity with corporations in exploiting the poor of the developing world and in
helping perpetuate the socioeconomic conditions that continue conditions of poverty
for large numbers, fueling lower education, higher unemployment, higher reproduction,
and greater reliance on the immediate environment for survival necessities—including
an increasing reliance on bush meat, which includes endangered species.
Those who are born into the most economically and ecologically challenging
conditions experience most directly what it means to be in a lifeboat situation by having
to live off the land when resources are limited and shrinking. When vital resources are
scarce, the metaphorical lifeboat that the land represents exceeds its carrying capacity
for humans and nonhumans alike. Comparing humans in such dire conditions to a
cancerous growth is akin to blessing their eradication. Robin Attfield thus criticizes
Rolston’s overt misanthropy toward the poor.
The possibility of extinctions has long been known, without usually
inclining those aware of it to the vocabulary of pathology. Granted the
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strong grounds for preserving species, agents should certainly adopt
concerted preservationist policies (and, where relevant, population
policies to prevent unsustainable population growth too), but need not
simultaneously regard their own existence and agency as some kind of
cosmic curse (Attfield 1998:300).
By adopting a vocabulary of pathology to refer to the poor, philosophers like Rolston
misrepresent the real problem. Since a human population’s practices are generally
more significant than its size in determining ecological degradation, environmentalists
should be primarily concerned with reducing the ecological footprints of developed
nations—whether by calling for reductions in population or for expansions of
environmentally sustainable practices. At the same time, environmentalists should call
on governments of the developed world to assist the poor whose existence puts
pressure on endangered species through voluntary education and relocation programs.
If environmentalists such as Rolston acknowledge that the global poor are detrimental
to the health of the environment, they must emphasize that the global wealthy are
much more so, especially if they exert their unsustainably enormous ecological
footprints on a geologic timescale. Since the ecological footprints of consumers in
developed nations tend to be exponentially greater than those of consumers in the
developing nations where nonhuman species are threatened with extinction, the
governments of the developed world should be acknowledged to have stronger duties
to alleviate the ecological predicament.
3.9

Mass Extinction – Crossing a Dangerous Threshold
If death is a harm, it is a harm for individual organisms. Extinction should thus be

considered a meta-harm since it is the death of an entire species. As Holmes Rolston
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states it, “Extinction kills forms (species)—not just individuals; it kills collectively, not
just distributively. Killing a natural kind is the death of birth, not just of an individual life.
The historical lineage is stopped forever” (Rolston 1996:265).

From an

environmentalist’s perspective, causing a species to go extinct is among the worst
harms that can be committed.

Environmentalists therefore condone policies that

protect, as far as possible, the rights of all species to exist within their native ranges and
to expand their ranges on natural spatiotemporal scales. Although species are always
on the move, taking advantage of niches that become available, the geologic record can
indicate which regions have been typically inhabited by a particular species.

The

geologic record also indicates the typical rates at which species go extinct. Because
anthropogenic extinctions exponentially surpass the normal, background rate of
extinction, it is apparent that a critical threshold has already been crossed. Recall
Benton’s explanation of the normal rate:
The background rate of extinction may be only 10 to 20% of species per
million years—10 or 20 species out of every 100 disappear every million
years, which translates to one or two species per 100 every 100,000 years
(Benton 2003:135).
The rate at which species are currently going extinct or otherwise altered through
adaptation to selection pressures is beginning to occur on a human rather than a
geologic timescale. The presence of Homo sapiens is in fact quickly becoming one of the
planet’s most powerful selection pressures, perhaps best compared to the abiotic
factors of Earth’s past—such as cosmic collisions, prolonged volcanic eruptions, and so
on—which were drivers of the previous five major mass extinction events of the past
600 million years that befell eukaryotic organisms like us. Coinciding with humanity’s
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dispersal into novel ecosystems over the past 50,000 to 70,000 years, native mammalian
species and genera have steadily gone extinct at rates exponentially exceeding the
natural background rate.
According to estimates of the biologist Wilson, species are dying
worldwide at a rate of about three per hour, or more than seventy per
day, and 27,000 per year, each a unique specimen of life that has
gradually come to be over hundreds of thousands of years. Extrapolating
from present trends, we can expect an even greater increase in the loss
of species. Pimm and Raven estimate that the extinction rate in the
middle of this century may be about 50,000 per million species and
decade. If we assume that approximately one species per year
disappeared before the coming of humankind, this translates to a rate of
species extinction that is more than one thousandfold greater than the
natural one (Gorke 2003:1).
When habitats are altered or occupied by humans, their native, longstanding
compositions are disrupted, with the largest mammals the most vulnerable to
displacement or extinction because they require more space and resources than other
organisms do. When surrounding habitats are also occupied or altered by humans,
large mammals lose access to the migratory routes or resources needed to remain
viable. They become critically endangered and, in terms of their role in ecosystem
processes, are functionally extinct. Their complete extinction is almost guaranteed to
take place on a scale of time that is recognizably human. However, the disappearance
of a species leaves a permanent mark on a geologic scale. Every time that humans
extirpate a species, there are ecological repercussions, which may be indiscernible at
first. However, the more species that we extinguish, the greater the long-term effects
are likely to be. According to Benton:
Low levels of extinction can turn into high levels. Destroying species and
habitats piecemeal might lead to a runaway crisis, as seems to have
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happened in the past. Once the world becomes locked into a spiral of
downward decline, it is impossible to see how any intervention by
humans could turn it back. It could be, for example, that removing one
or two species from an ecosystem does little damage. The remaining
species can adapt and plug the gaps. But if another few species are
picked off, then another few, and then a few more, a point may be
reached when that ecosystem will collapse. Better to stop destroying the
environment before we become locked into such a catastrophic
sequence of events. The natural world is complex, and consequences are
often unpredictable (Benton 2003:299).
In considering the mass extinction events of the past, Rolston adopts a geologic
view to argue that such extinctions are necessary for evolution to take place, since
without such events life would come to a stagnant bottleneck. Once available niches
have been filled, mass extinctions open the door for new forms to emerge. Rolston
considers such a process to be ultimately positive, creative, and value-generating.
These periodic cutbacks prepare the way for more complex diversity later
on. We first think that the catastrophic extinctions were quite a bad
thing, an unlucky disaster. But in fact they were good luck. Indeed, were
it not for such extinctions we humans would not be here, nor would any
of the mammalian complexity. Life on Earth is so resilient that normal
geological processes lack the power to cause widespread extinctions in
major groups. But just such a resetting is needed—rarely but periodically
(at least on a geologic time scale). We should think twice before judging
these catastrophic extinctions to be a bad thing (Rolston 1994:48).
Rolston’s approval of mass extinctions is due to their causal role in producing ‘complex’
forms such as humans. As William Grey notes, an attitude such as that expressed by
Rolston seems altogether un-nonanthropocentric.
There is of course an excellent reason for us to retrospectively evaluate
these great planetary disruptions positively from our current position in
planetary history, and that is that we can recognise their occurrence as a
necessary condition for our own existence. But what could be more
anthropocentric than that? However, as Gould has pointed out, mass
extinctions are awful for those who are caught up in them (Grey
1993:469).
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Rolston next appears to reverse his position on mass extinction by stating that the
current anthropogenic one is inherently bad.
There is one conclusion we must not draw from this. One might say,
“Well, if catastrophic extinctions are so innovative, perhaps we need not
worry about the anthropogenic ones.” Yet that fails to take into account
the radical differences between natural and anthropogenic extinctions.
Anthropogenic extinction has nothing to do with evolutionary speciation.
Hundreds of thousands of species will perish because of culturally altered
environments that are far different from the spontaneous environments
in which such species were naturally selected and in which they
sometimes become extinct. In a natural extinction, nature takes away life,
when it has become unfit in habitat or when the habitat alters, and
supplies other life in its place. Artificial extinction shuts down tomorrow,
because it shuts down speciation altogether. Natural extinction typically
occurs with transformation, either of the extinct line or related or
competing lines. Artificial extinction is without issue. One opens the
doors; the other closes them. In artificial extinctions, humans generate
and regenerate nothing; they only dead-end these lines. There can be
little respeciation on toxic soils and none at all on asphalt (Rolston
1994:49).
There is a clear inconsistency here that results from an error in reasoning.
Rolston’s approval of past mass extinctions is based on a holistic rationalist’s utilization
of a geologic timescale, but his disapproval of the anthropogenic one is based on a
timescale that is much more parochial.

Although Rolston begins his analysis by

positively valuing mass extinctions of the past, he then commits a disanalogy by
comparing natural, background extinctions, which Benton indicates to be “one or two
species per 100 every 100,000 years,” to the anthropogenic mass extinction, which
involves an exponentially larger loss in species over a brief period of time. While there
is indeed a radical difference between background extinctions and mass extinctions,
there is not a radical difference between mass extinctions of the past and the current,
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anthropogenic one. It is precisely their striking similarity that makes the current mass
extinction event so disturbing to environmentalists. Rolston is simply mistaken in
claiming that there will be no respeciation after the anthropogenic mass extinction
event, although it will likely take place on a nonanthropocentric scale of time similar to
the one that followed the K-T event 65 million years ago. Of course, humans and their
asphalt will no longer be around to witness the respeciation, but that is beside the point.
The end-Permian mass extinction event 265 million years ago wiped out perhaps 95% of
all life forms on our planet, a figure much greater than the number that will likely be
extirpated by humans. It took approximately 100 million years for species richness to
‘return’ to pre-extinction levels.

If, according to Rolston’s adoption of holistic

rationalism, a mass extinction such as the end-Permian event is to be viewed in a
positive light, then for consistency’s sake the current mass extinction event should also
be viewed as a good thing overall.
If Rolston’s holistic rationalism were consistently expressed, he would have no
grounds for criticizing extinctions of any kind, anthropogenic or otherwise. Callicott
rejects holistic rationalism for this reason.
Considering our time as but an infinitesimal moment of the three-andone-half-billion-year tenure of life on planet earth (let alone the
possibility that earth may be but one of many planets to possess a biota),
man's tendency to destroy other species might be viewed quite
disinterestedly as a transitional stage in the earth's evolutionary
odyssey. ... A holistic rationalist could not regret the massive die-off of
the late Cretaceous because it made possible our yet richer mammalpopulated world. The Age of Mammals may yet likewise end. But the
"laws" of organic evolution and of ecology (if any there be) will remain
operative. Nonhuman life would go on even after a nuclear holocaust. In
time speciation would occur and species would radiate anew. Future
"intelligent" forms of life may even feel grateful, if not to us then to their
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God (or the Good), for making their world possible. The new Age (of
Insects, perhaps) would eventually be just as diverse, orderly,
harmonious, and stable and thus no less good than our current
ecosystem with its present complement of species (Callicott 1989:142).
However, in discussing why he believes the geologic scale is not morally meaningful,
Callicott makes claims similar to those of Rolston. Like Rolston, Callicott’s analysis of
past mass extinctions does not match his strong disapproval of the current one.
The last great extinction event, which occurred 65 million years ago, is
not reprehensible. Nor does the expectation that in 50 million years
biodiversity will have bounced back from the anthropogenic mass
extinction event now in progress let us off the ethical hook. We should
not fret over the deep past, nor should we exonerate ourselves by
contemplating the deep future (Callicott 2002:297).
Because Callicott rejects the moral relevance of a geologic scale, he finds nothing
reprehensible about the K-T event. According to his human-centered, ecological scale,
however, he is able to find fault with the current anthropogenic mass extinction event.
Nevertheless, in order to identify what exactly is wrong with current extinctions,
Callicott must utilize a geologic scale to highlight the abnormal rate at which they are
taking place.
Normally, speciation out paces extinction—which is the reason why
biodiversity has increased over time. So, what is land-ethically wrong
with current anthropogenic species extinction? Species extinction is not
unnatural. On the contrary, species extinction—anthropogenic or
otherwise—is perfectly natural. But the current rate of extinction is
wildly abnormal. Does being the first biological agent of a geologically
significant mass extinction event in the 3.5-billion-year tenure of life on
Planet Earth morally become us Homo sapiens? Doesn't that make a
mockery of the self-congratulatory species epithet: the sapient, the wise
species of the genus Homo (Callicott 1999:136)?
During the history of life on Earth, speciation and extinction have normally occurred on
a geologic rather ecological scale of time. Also, since Callicott references the billions of
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years that life has been present on Earth in order to highlight what should be morally
condemned about abnormal anthropogenic extinctions, it should be clear even to
himself that he does find a geologic scale morally relevant. Furthermore, if nonhuman
life forms are intrinsically valuable and can be harmed, as Callicott, Rolston, and other
nonanthropocentrists repeatedly affirm, then their extinction is decidedly a bad thing—
at least, for them. Mass extinctions are the most apocalyptic ecological events that can
take place on our planet. Just because a mass extinction took place several million years
ago, that does not lessen the harms that were inflicted on the life forms that existed
then. Such an extinction may not have been bad for humans, but to claim further that
they were bad for no other life forms is a short-sighted anthropocentric conclusion that
fails to acknowledge that harms can befall nonhumans as well.
Environmentalists such as Callicott and Rolston, who only consider the mass
extinction of current life forms to be a bad thing, seem to regard such nonhumanity as
more intrinsically valuable than any that existed in the geologic past or that could
opportunistically exist in the geologic future as new niches are opened up by human
activities. What is it that makes current species so valuable? The best response seems
to be an anthropocentric one. Such species have existed alongside Homo sapiens
throughout its evolutionary history. Witnessing the demise of all these species may be
akin to seeing the canary die in the coal mine. It is a dire warning of what awaits Homo
sapiens if the conditions in the ‘coal mine’ do not change. Of course, life will ‘bounce
back.’ The life forms that will exist in the distant future as a result of the anthropogenic
mass extinction event may be more numerous and ‘complex’ than those that would
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have existed otherwise. Regardless, the use of a geologic spatiotemporal scale should
not produce radical stoicism regarding humanity’s influence on the biosphere, as would
be the case for one who consistently adopted rational holism. Instead, it should make
us reconsider what type of legacy we are bestowing upon future life forms, humans and
nonhumans alike.
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Chapter Four: Conclusion
4.1

What Have We Learned So Far?
Throughout the dissertation I have argued that, as predicted by Norton’s

convergence hypothesis, those who subscribe to ecological anthropocentrism would
tend to endorse the same sorts of policies that would be endorsed by proponents of
“reasonable” forms of nonanthropocentrism.

I have demonstrated that those

environmentalists identified by Norton’s hypothesis subscribe to the AFV since they
openly profess their toleration of humanity’s continued existence—in spite of the
immense atrocities that human societies have committed against nature.

Any

environmental ethic that is worthy of rational support must be both fundamentally
nonindividualistic and long-sighted since the spatiotemporal scales that are deemed
morally considerable by individuals do not adequately consider ecological wholes or
individuals’ complicit participation in collective-action wrongs.
Environmental problems involve an asymmetrical problem in decision
scale—actions that are rational from an individual viewpoint lead
inexorably to the destruction of a public, community-level value that
emerges on a larger and more long-term scale. . . . Since environmental
problems result from large-scale impacts of cumulative trends in
individual decisions, multi-generational values are the ones that are
relevant to assessing the choices, the options, and the opportunities
available to future people (Norton 2000:38).
What I hope to have made clear is that subscribing to the AFV requires one to
acknowledge the moral relevance of a geologic spatiotemporal scale. Since the aim of
the AFV is the long-term evolutionary success of our species and our evolutionary
descendants, and given that such success would be measured in millions of years, a
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scale that encompasses a handful of centuries or millennia would cover the merest
fraction of our species’ future.
Callicott argues that the emergence of environmental philosophy coincided with
a paradigm shift in ethics, that, in fact, human societies are ready for the next step in
the evolution of morality. He claims that the chief characteristic of the new paradigm is
that humans are not the only entities that are acknowledged to have intrinsic value.
While I agree with Callicott that a new paradigm is emerging, the shift is not due to an
expansion of the entities that are intrinsically valued by humans. Instead, the paradigm
shift concerns a conceptual revision of anthropocentrism.

Being environmentally

human-centered does not imply that all nonhuman aspects of the world must be
“quantified on a monetary metric” (Callicott 2009:144).
Neither economic productivity nor aesthetic and intergenerational moral
values can be protected without protecting the complex, organized
system that provides the ecological context on which all values depend.
To assume that all values are economic values is to ignore this implicit,
background value in the ecological processes that support economic, and
all other, activity (Norton 1991:196).
Anthropocentrism’s new paradigm is ecological and thus recognizes that since humans
are part of nature, it is in their interest to maintain the stability, integrity, health, and so
on of the ecosystems and other natural resources that promote the satisfaction of the
full range of human values that are worthy of rational support.
I hope that I have demonstrated that nonanthropocentrists such as Callicott
bank too heavily on the practical effectiveness of the concept of intrinsic value. A
tremendous amount of human suffering exists in the world that could be alleviated by
governments that presumably pursue anthropocentric policies.
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However, the

widespread acknowledgement within such societies that humans are intrinsically
valuable has not compelled them to pay much more than lip service to the human rights
of those who suffer. Thus, the expectations of nonanthropocentrists regarding what
would follow from the widespread acknowledgement in these societies of
nonhumanity’s intrinsic value seems to be more an article of faith than to be based on
empirical observations.

Since the ecological predicament is global in nature,

encompassing indeed the entire biosphere, the number of entities involved drastically
exceeds that of the humans whose plight is widely ignored. Whether by choice or not,
most people are ignorant of the effects of their everyday behaviors on extant fellow
humans. An act as seemingly benign as consuming a chocolate bar, if performed by
enough people, may be essential to maintaining the practice of slavery in places like the
Ivory Coast. With less demand for chocolate, the owners of cocoa plantations in such
places would at least maintain fewer slaves. “And because Côte d’Ivoire supplies 43
percent of the world’s supply of cocoa beans and is the primary supplier to U.S.
chocolate makers, there is a lot of chocolate out there on American retail shelves with
the slavery taint” (Schwartz 2010:24). If we are blind to our complicit participation in
collective actions that increase the plight of fellow humans who are spatially distant
from us, we are doubly blind regarding our effects on those who are temporally distant.
The same goes for our ignorance regarding the effects of our collective actions on
nonhumanity in general.
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4.2

Looking Forward – The Problem of Nero’s Fiddle
One might ask:

So what is the point of this dissertation?

Haven’t I just

suggested that the ecological predicament is irremediable? I acknowledge that given
the track record of human societies, there is indeed little reason to hope that problems
as complex as global warming, mass extinction, biotic homogenization, and the
proliferation of invasive species will be adequately addressed. If such problems are
indeed capable of being alleviated, this will require the unprecedented, immediate, and
prolonged cooperation of most nations on Earth. Andrew Fiala refers to this paradox as
the problem of Nero’s Fiddle. “The difficulty is that a focus on narrow and short-term
interest can appear to be rational in the midst of a crisis—especially when the crisis
appears to be hopelessly unsolvable” (Fiala 2010:53).

Unless the severity of the

ecological predicament is adequately communicated to the public, it is unlikely that
people will be motivated to alter those of their behaviors that contribute to the crisis.
However, when environmentalists realistically convey what it would take to solve the
problem, it appears that only immediate and prolonged global cooperation will be
sufficient.

If one then considers the conflict, disagreement and competition that

historically characterize relations among humans within states and across their borders,
there is very little reason to expect the necessary cooperation to take place. After
thoroughly considering the predicament, it may indeed seem rational to conclude that
the situation is hopeless. Since the number of people willing to voluntarily sacrifice
short-term pleasures for the sake of humanity’s long-term future is likely to be
insufficient, any given person’s attempts to be ecologically responsible will seemingly be
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for naught. Thus, even the conscientious individual may conclude that it would be
rational to fiddle while Rome burns, to adopt just the kind of selfish disregard for the
environment and for future humans that would reinforce the problem.
Realistic assessments such as those of nonanthropocentrist Laura Westra that
democratic institutions seem unlikely to remedy the ecological predicament add fuel to
the pessimist’s fire and may only inspire more individuals to opt for egoism.
Although changes in the balance of power between more and less
developed countries, and within these between powerful and wealthy
and disempowered groups, are desirable on other grounds,
environmentally, no guaranteed success would ensue. As long as the
emphasis remains on atomistic, individualistic rights, even the desirable
change of power among present holders of power and those who lack it,
will not suffice. There is nothing to prevent an individual in a less
developed country to want desperately to enjoy not only freedom from
famine and deprivation, but also parity with the life-style of more
developed countries, with all their wasteful and unsafe practices. Nor is
there any ground or mechanism to prevent such occurrences, if civil
liberties (desirable as they are) remain primary (Westra 1993:133).
Norton acknowledges that humans may eventually face a future in which only a
Leviathan could possibly stabilize Earth’s natural resources such that prospects for
humanity’s long-term evolutionary success are strengthened. As I have alluded to
throughout the dissertation, such a future would be rife with Smilanskian regret.11
The future would be justified in vilifying us if they face a world in which,
for example, resource shortages are so severe that only a totalitarian
government can sufficiently control population and limit access to overtaxed resources, thus breaking their ties to earlier generations that have

11

I argued in Chapter One that Smilanskian regret should be tempered so that it does not morally require
one to be willing to sacrifice his or her existence in order to ‘correct’ the sins of humanity. However,
Smilansky seems right in asserting that one who values humanity as such should nevertheless regret that
his or her existence cannot be causally decoupled from such sins. Furthermore, it is rational for extant
humans to try to avoid creating a future in which their individual and collective actions are regrettable in
Smilansky’s sense.
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painfully evolved toward democratic control of governments (Norton
2000:39).
Fiala claims that if there is a solution to the paradox of Nero’s Fiddle, it is “to foster an
alternative form of rationality that looks beyond short-term utility” (Fiala 2010:53).
That is precisely one of ecological anthropocentrism’s main objectives. According to
proponents of ecological anthropocentrism, it is rational to prefer a universe in which
humans flourish on a geologic spatiotemporal scale. As Norton points out, this form of
rationality requires that considered preferences take priority over merely felt ones.
Ultimately, the central aim of the dissertation has been to demonstrate that
ecological anthropocentrism provides a strong foundation for a rationally defensible
environmental ethic. I have also tried to demonstrate that the overall objectives of
ecological anthropocentrists do not differ significantly from those of “reasonable”
nonanthropocentrists because both of these types of environmentalists ultimately
subscribe to the AFV. If current human societies embrace the “alternative form of
rationality” represented by proponents of ecological anthropocentrism, they will
endorse policies that rational beings of Earth’s indefinite future would universally
condone. Consequently, such beings would have fewer reasons to regret the conditions
that bring them into existence and would be less likely to condemn current humans as
moral monsters. Finally, I hope that the arguments I have presented will help convince
environmentalists with disparate beliefs about ultimate values to realize that such
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differences of opinion should not prevent them from working together to promote
policies aimed at a better future for humans and nonhumans alike. 12

Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016

12

Presumably, a ‘better’ future for nonhumans is one in which, among other things, anthropogenic
extinctions do not exponentially outpace geologically normal, background extinctions, and ecosystem
processes provide stable ‘services’ for all Earth’s life forms.
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